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I. INTRODUCTION
The Guidelines' concerted effort to produce identical sentences for men and
women who commit similar crimes, while never completely successful, imposed
draconian costs on families as well as on women who do not resemble the violent
male drug dealers who inspired the severe federal drug penalties. For a number of
years, I have been an outspoken critic of the Guidelines, particularly as it relates
to family ties and other defendant oriented departures.' Not only have I argued
that gender-related differences can play a legitimate role in sentencing, but that a
completely gender-neutral sentencing scheme is bad policy because it has the
potential of increasing intergenerational crime by ignoring the gendered realities
of caregiving in our current society.
This article discusses why gender related issues are legitimate sentencing
factors and reviews the departures that have gendered applications. In addition, I
contend that Booker's reasonableness analysis provides the flexibility to approve
non-Guidelines sentences based on gender-related factors and caution against
interpreting the advisory Guidelines as a straitjacket that confines the analysis of
1. See, e.g., Myma S. Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female Offenders, 20
CRIM. JUST. 4 (2005); Myma S. Raeder, Gendered Implications of Sentencing and Correctional Practices, in
GENDERED JUSTICE: ADDRESSING FEMALE OFFENDERS (Barbara Bloom ed., Carolina Academic Press, 2003);
Myma S. Raeder, Remember the Family: Seven Myths About Single Parenting Departures, 13 FED. SENT'G
REP. 251 (2001) [hereinafter Remember the Family]; Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties:
The Plight of Nonviolent Women Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 133 (1999)
[hereinafter Severing Family Ties]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Forgotten Offender: Effects of Federal Sentencing
Policy on Women and Their Children, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 157 (1995); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues Raised
by the Sentencing Guidelines, 8 CRIM. JUST. 20 (1993); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single
Mors, Battered Women and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993) [hereinafter Gender and Sentencing].
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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the reasonableness of non-Guidelines sentences. I critique the practice of
requiring judges to decide the appropriateness of departures before issuing non-
Guidelines sentences and also suggest an approach to arguing child centered
issues that focuses on the family as a fundamental liberty interest that should be
considered in sentencing. While the presence of mandatory minimums will
continue to constrain federal sentencing, the safety valve and prosecutorial
motions for substantial assistance should help to ameliorate the worst excesses of
the federal system. Finally, I discuss the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations
concerning community correctional centers, urging their expanded use for
women offenders and their children.
II. GENDERED DIFFERENCES IN FEMALE CRIMINALITY
Two of the basic tenets underlying the Guidelines are that sex has no role in
sentencing3 and that downward departures based on individual characteristics of
defendants should be limited to extraordinary circumstances.4 However, despite
the dramatic influx of women into the criminal justice system, their numbers still
pale in comparison to males, and judges continue to find differences that result in
women being over-represented in federal non-incarcerative sentences. For
example, in 2003, females under federal correctional supervision were
approximately 34% of probationers, 18% of those under supervised release, and
3% of parolees.5 Yet this is scant comfort when it is estimated that in the face of
nearly a decade of dropping crime rates, women are now three times more likely
today to go to prison than in 1986.6
By year-end 2004, women accounted for 7% of all federal prisoners, up from
5.7% in 1990. 7 The federal system now ranks second behind Texas in the number
of women it incarcerates and, along with California, houses over one-third of all
female prisoners." That increased incarceration is dictated in large measure by the
goal of getting tough on crime, rather than by public safety concerns, can be
demonstrated by a comparison with Western Europe, which incarcerates one-
tenth of the women incarcerated in the United States, even though it has
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Hl.10 (2005).
4. Seeid. § 5HI.
5. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 100 tbl.7.2 (2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/abstract/cfjs03.htm [hereinafter BJS COMPENDIUM] (including
statistics based on numbers provided from Oct. 1, 2002-Sept. 30, 2003) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
6. Women's Prison Association, Focus on Women & Justice Series, Trends in Arrests and Sentencing
(May 2004), available at http://www.wpaonline.org/WEBSITE/home.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); see also BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 108 tbl.7.10 (showing women as approximately 7% of
federal prisoners in 2003).
7. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2004 at 4-5 tbl.6 (2005), available at http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p04.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. Id. at 5.
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approximately the same population.9 While some states have been forced by
economic realities to take a closer look at who they incarcerate, the federal
prison-building spree continues to accommodate more women, including local
D.C. prisoners. Since 1995, the average annual increase of federal prisoners is
7.4%, compared to a state annual increase of 2.6%.'o
Federal drug laws clearly impact incarceration. While 57.5% of all convicted
federal female offenders were sentenced to incarceration, 82% of female drug
offenders were incarcerated, compared to 76% of female violent offenders." The
higher drug incarceration is likely the result of mandatory minimums and harsh
Guidelines sentences, since one would otherwise assume that violent offenders
would be punished more severely than drug offenders. Interestingly, the federal
violence category reflects a substantially higher rate of female convictions for
manslaughter (27%) than murder (11%), 12 possibly resulting from federal
jurisdiction over common law crimes in Indian country and other federal
enclaves,'3 where previously battered women who have killed their intimates may
be claiming self-defense. 4 In other words, even the nature of violence tends to
differ between men and women.
Since section 5H1.10 prohibits consideration of sex as a factor in
determining sentences, discussion of gender concerning Guidelines sentencing is
typically couched in terms not "based" on sex or gender, but instead is identified
as "gender related."' '5 Yet, despite the 5H1.10 ban, being female is positively
correlated with rehabilitation, and studies show lower rates of recidivism for
females than males. 16 For example, in 2003, 74% of females were terminated
from federal supervised release without violation, compared to nearly 60% of
men. 17 Similarly, there is evidence from a recent study of probationers that gender
has a statistically significant effect on recidivism, and that women may be
9. AMNESTY INT'L, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN
CUSTODY III, at 15 (1999), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/usa/document.do?id=DOF5C2222
D1AABEA8025690000692FC4 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. ld. at 2 tbl.1.
11. BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 76 tbl.5.4.
12. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT tbl.5 (2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 2000).
14. Cf United States v. Whitetail, 956 F.2d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a jury's rejection of a
defendant's claim of self-defense based on battered-woman syndrome did not preclude the district court from
considering battered-woman syndrome as a mitigating factor at sentencing for second degree murder).
15. See Nancy Gertner, Women Offenders and the Sentencing Guidelines, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
291, 296 (2002).
16. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY
COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 11 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/
RecidivismGeneral.pdf (listing two-year recidivism rate for men as 24.3%, compared to a 13.7% rate for
women; and noting a 15% difference in recidivism in Criminal History Categories V and VI) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). See generally Candace Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women's Imprisonment in
30 CRIME & JUST. 50 (2003) (summarizing general literature).
17. BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 104 tbl.7.6.
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overclassified in terms of risk.8 Recent state studies duplicate theses findings. 9
The current draft of the Model Penal Code on Sentencing would permit gender as
a consideration in sentencing "if there is a reasonable basis in the law for doing
so.9)20 Similarly, a non-Guidelines sentence was imposed in United States v.
Carmona-Rodriguez,' for an older woman based on markedly lower rates of
recidivism for defendants over the age of forty, without referring to the fact that
her gender was equally significant, regardless of her age.
In an earlier study, Professor Daly, a criminologist, suggested that direct
comparison of similar sounding crimes often reveals that the woman is less
blameworthy than her male counterpart. In reaching this conclusion, she evaluated
the "gestalt of the harm," which considers such factors as the relationship between
victim and offender, the manner in which the crime was committed, as well as the
mix of offense and offender biography.23 Thus, even in a Guidelines equality based
mode of sentencing, lighter sentences for females may be justified, although a
statistical analysis would not reveal the nuances or textured reasoning that explain
away any sentencing differential.
The Guidelines pay little attention to these gendered dynamics that help to
24
explain why women appear to do better than men even in a Guidelines regime. In
fact, much of the differential may exist because a large percentage of women are first
offenders. Indeed, substantially higher proportions of first offenders are females who
have absolutely no prior criminal history.25 Because this complete absence of
criminality is not adequately addressed in the current Guideline matrix, it is arguable
that such first time offenders are disadvantaged by the Guidelines, with women
comprising a significant proportion of this shortchanged group.26 This problem exists
despite the statutory direction given to the Sentencing Commission to consider the
appropriateness of sentences other than imprisonment for first offenders.
18. See David E. Olson et al., Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus, but What Role Does Gender
Play in Probation Recidivism? 5 JUST. RES. & POL'Y 33 (2003).
19. California recidivism statistics show male felon recidivism after one year as nearly 42%, compared to
29% for female felons, at two years 54% compared to 41%, and at three years 59% compared to 45%. CAL. DEPT.
CORRECTIONS, RISK MANAGEMENT Div., RECIDIVISM RATE (Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.corr.ca.gov/
ReportsResearch/OffenderlnfoServices/Annual/RECID3/Recid3d2002.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); BRIAN J. OSTROM, ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA (2002), available at http://nicic.
org/Misc/URLShell.aspx?SRC=Catalog&REFF=http://nicic.org/Library/018016&ID=018016&TYPE=PDF&URL
=http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk offrpt.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.06(4)(b) (Council Draft No. 1, Sept. 27, 2006).
21. 2005 WL 840464, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2005).
22. KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 165-67 (1994).
23. Id. at 90, 99, 165.
24. BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 77 tbl.5.5.
25. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, RECIDIVISM AND THE "FIRST OFFENDER" 1I (May 2004), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ publicat/Recidivism FirstOffender.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
26. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Re-Conceptualizing Criminal History for FirstTime Offenders, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 191, 192 (2005) (finding nearly forty percent of the individuals with no prior arrests were women);
see Panel l, Disparity in Sentencing-Race and Gender, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 160 (2003).
27. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (1994)).
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Studies have been inconsistent as to whether any significant disparity exists
when the relevant factors are controlled. The United States Sentencing
Commission recently published a report on racial, ethnic, and gender disparities,
which found gender disparity favoring women in federal sentencing, but did not
conclude whether this was based on improper considerations such as paternalism
as opposed to such factors as child care responsibilities.
Notwithstanding sex being a forbidden factor, there is little doubt that men
and women differ significantly in their criminal profiles, starting with their
pathways to crime, the crimes they commit, their roles in criminal activity, and
their family dynamics. 29 Females often enter the criminal justice system due to
their attempts to survive victimization. For example, female offenders report very
high instances of physical and sexual abuse, totaling more than 40% of federal
inmates. ° Private studies indicate even higher rates of abuse, ranging from 60%
to 80%." This picture accords with the route taken by many juvenile girls into the
criminal justice system. They start by running away from abusive homes; are
brought into the dependency system as status offenders; then violate a court
order, typically not to run away or be truant again, and thereby become
delinquent.
Moreover, despite the Guidelines' determination to treat all defendants as
fungible, women simply do not mirror male criminality. In 2003, a comparison of
males to females who were arrested federally reveals that women account for
only 14% of all federal arrests, 8% of violent arrests, 15% of drug arrests, but
approximately 30% of property arrests. 3  Federally convicted offenders also
reflect this disparity, with women comprising approximately 13% of all
convictions, nearly 8% of violent offenses, 26% of property offenses, and 13% of
28. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 128-29 (2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/15-year/15year.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
29. See generally DANA D. DEHART, PATHWAYS TO PRISON: IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION IN THE LIVES
OF INCARCERATED WOMEN (2004), available at http://nicic.org/Misc/URLShell.aspx?SRC=Catalog&REFF=
http://nicic.org/Library/020226&ID=020226&TYPE=PDF&URL=http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesi/nij/grants/208
383.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
30. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY INMATES
AND PROBATIONERS 1-2 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/parip.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). The percentage of state prisoners is even higher (nearly sixty percent). Id.
31. See, e.g., CHI. COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, UNLOCKING OPTIONS FOR WOMEN: A SURVEY OF
WOMEN IN COOK COUNTY JAIL 1 (2002), available at http://www.chicagohomeless.org/factsfigures/jailstudy.
pdf (finding that women inmates in the Cook County Jail had been victims of child abuse, sexual assault, and
domestic violence at rates two and three times the national average; majority were homeless at the time of their
arrest, and many also had histories of substance abuse and mental illness, often associated with their past abuse
having gone untreated) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., What About the Girls? The Role of the Federal Government in Addressing
the Rise in Female Juvenile Offenders, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 29, 35-36 (2003) (noting that sixty percent of
all runaways are girls and decrying the mixed message that we give adult women to flee abuse, while
criminalizing girls for the same behavior). See generally Alecia Humphrey, The Criminalization of Survival
Attempts: Locking Up Female Runaways and Other Status Offenders, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (2004).
33. BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 19 tbl. 1.3.
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drug offenses.34 Generally, racial and ethnic differences, which some attribute to
the war on drugs, result in a disproportionate percentage of minority women and
their children being impacted by incarceration.' For example, the number of
Hispanic female inmates increased 71% from 1990 to 1996.36 In 2003, African-
American females were more than twice as likely as Hispanic females, and
nearly five times more likely than white females, to be incarcerated.37 In addition,
about 58% of all sentenced female inmates were minorities in 2003.3s This
pattern is replicated in the federal system, where more than 60% of incarcerated
women in 2003 were imprisoned for drug offenses.39
There is a virtual consensus that incarcerated women are an incredibly needy
population. Besides profound physical and sexual abuse, many have entrenched
histories of drug and alcohol dependence and serious physical and mental health
disorders. ° Women also have higher rates of HIV infection than male inmates, as
well as co-occurring substance abuse.4 ' The fact that this population of women
engages in substance abuse should come as no surprise. Commentators and
service providers posit that a correlation exists between victimization and
specific high-risk behaviors such as serious polydrug abuse.4'2 Thus, it is likely
that some segment of female offenders resort to substance abuse to self medicate
43depression resulting from their violent encounters and/or mental illness or as a
34. Id. at 65 tbl.4.5.
35. See generally Josephine Gittler, The American Drug War, Maternal Substance Abuse And Child
Protection: A Commentary, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 237 (2003); MARC MAUER, ET AL., GENDER AND
JUSTICE: WOMEN, DRUGS, AND SENTENCING POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1999), available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/pdfs9042smy.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
36. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1997, tbl.12 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p97.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003, 10 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. Id. at 9.
39. See BJS COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 108 tbl.8 (showing women as 8% of 85,789 drug offenders,
compared to a total prison population of nearly 11,000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT
tbl.7.
40. See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT
OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf (noting
that approximately eighty percent of mentally ill females reported physical or sexual abuse) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf (noting that more than fifty percent of female jail inmates
were dependent on alcohol or drugs) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
41. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT TO THE HONORABLE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, WOMEN IN PRISON: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES CONFRONTING U.S. CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEMS 4, 7, 24-25, 73 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00022.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
42. See, e.g., U.S. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON
WOMEN OFFENDERS 22-29, 33-40 (1999), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/Ips9890/Aps9890/www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/cpo/womenoffenders/women.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
43. See DITTON, supra note 40.
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way to avoid dealing with deeper traumas that have scarred them. Similarly, the
link between substance abuse and criminality is well accepted.
Given the relatively few community-based residential substance abuse or
mental health programs for indigent women with children, it is arguable that we
have turned prisons into the social services agency of last resort. Thus,
correctional officials are often stymied about how to deal with women offenders
because their problems do not implicate the traditional discipline, security, and
escape concerns associated with men's prisons. In other words, physical and
mental health care, treatment for substance abuse and trauma, and relationships
inside as well as outside prison, not security, are the major operational is-sues in
most women's institutions. Prior to Booker, the Guidelines attempted to mask all
gender related differences. Now that all factors relating to a just sentence can be
discussed, the genie is out of the bottle, and the reasonableness review provides a
vehicle for reintroducing gender-related realities into the policy debate.
III. THE GENDERED IMPACT OF SENTENCING ON CHILDREN
OF INCARCERATED MOTHERS
High among the gender related impacts caused by Guidelines sentencing is
the tragic effect of long prison sentences on the children of incarcerated mothers.
Elsewhere, I have argued at length, with little success, why family ties departures
should be granted more frequently." Nearly seventy percent of women under
correctional sanction have two minor children45 and about half of women in
federal prisons with young children had lived with those children prior to
entering prison.46 In 1999, more than 1.3 million minor children had a mother
under correctional sanction in the United States; more than a quarter million of
these children had mothers who are serving time in prison or jail.4' A recent
California study estimated 152,000 children with incarcerated mothers in 2001. 8
It is likely that the number of children impacted by their mother's federal
incarceration is similar, given comparable incarceration statistics.
Many incarcerated women are single mothers, who are marginally employed.
Nearly thirty percent of female inmates reported receiving welfare assistance at
the time just before the arrest that resulted in their sentence.49 Yet we sentence
these women based on male models of criminality and violence, giving them
long sentences for nonviolent drug and property offenses that ignore the
44. See supra note 1.
45. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, WOMEN
OFFENDERS 7 (1999), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id.
48. See CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, CALIFORNIA LAW AND THE
CHILDREN OF PRISONERS 1, 6 (2003), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/O3/03/03-003.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
49. GREENFELD, supra note 45, at 8.
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disruption that children face when their sole or primary parent is incarcerated.
This blindness to gender-related realities occurs even though there is no dispute
that, unlike the children of male offenders who overwhelmingly reside with their
mothers, children of single mothers are typically shifted to other relatives,
friends, or foster care, with less than 30% residing with their father. ° Siblings are
often separated and may be sent to live in unstable environments.
Pre-Booker, the federal system was particularly harsh in discounting family
ties as a reason to lower sentences, ignoring the fact that many of these nonviolent
female offenders are single parents by labeling it as not "extraordinary." We are
one of the few countries that routinely separate incarcerated mothers from their
infants. Most keep young children with their mothers and provide alternatives to
prison, intuitively recognizing that parental bonding is a necessary step in the
development of a healthy child. Reactions of children to separation can include
guilt, "denial, anger, anxiety, inability to concentrate, depression, sadness, grief,
shame, . . . fear," developmental regression,5' and even post traumatic stress
disorder.52 It is common knowledge that children of incarcerated parents have
greater risk of offending. The introduction to the bipartisan Second Chance Act
states, "[t]he long-term generational effects of a social structure in which
imprisonment is the norm and law-abiding role models are absent are difficult to
measure but undoubtedly exist."53 For example, a study in Sacramento County,
California, found that of all children arrested between the ages of nine and twelve,
45% had an incarcerated parent. Another study revealed a 60% rate of teenage
pregnancy of female children of incarcerated mothers and a 40% delinquency rate
for teenage sons."
IV. THE GENDERED IMPACT OF SENTENCING ON Loss OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Unnecessary prison terms also destroy the ability to maintain family ties that
are essential to ensuring family reunification and avoiding termination of parental
rights under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).56 ASFA's timelines can
50. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILDREN 1 (2000), available at http:/lwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf (noting ninety percent of
children of incarcerated males reside with their mothers) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
51. See Simmons, supra note 48, at 6; Julie Poehlmann, Representations of Attachment Relationships in
Children of Incarcerated Mothers, 76 CHILD DEV. 679, 682 (2005). See generally CHILDREN OF
INCARCERATED PARENTS (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston, eds., 1995).
52. Jackie Crawford, Alternative Sentencing Necessary for Female Inmates With Children, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, June, 2003, available at http://www.aca.org/publications/ctarchivespdf/june03/commentary-june.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
53. S. Res. 2789, 108th Cong. (2004).
54. SIMMONS, supra note 48, at 7.
55. Crawford, supra note 52.
56. Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.). See generally PATRICIA E. ALLARD & LYNN D. Lu, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, REBUILDING FAMILIES, RECLAIMING LIVES: STATE OBLIGATIONS TO CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE AND
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result in even an eighteen-month prison sentence being a death penalty for
parental rights, sentencing mothers to a lifetime without their children.
Termination proceedings are mandated if a child spends fifteen out of twenty-two
months in foster care, unless the child is in the care of a relative, 7 the family has
not been provided with reunification services, or a compelling reason exists as to
why it is not in the best interest of the child to terminate the parental
relationship. s In the five years after ASFA was adopted, reported cases
concerning termination of parental rights increased approximately 250% .9 Laws
concerning termination of parental rights vary and pose significant problems for
incarcerated women.6° While incarceration per se is not a reason justifying
termination in most states,6' several include a provision for lengthy62 or repeated
incarceration.63 Moreover, cases involving termination of incarcerated parents
often cite reasons that are a consequence of imprisonment: 6 child in foster care
most of her life, parental failure to contact or support child for a period of over
six months, parent incapable of performing parental duties, parent's progress
stagnated, abandonment, or parent failed to rehabilitate.65 Female inmates are
impacted disproportionately to men, since as previously mentioned, due to the
THEIR INCARCERATED PARENTS (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/cj/Family
%20Rights%20Report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., VERA INST. OF
JUST., HARD DATA ON HARD TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE,
AND VISITATION, (2004), available at http://www.vera.org/publicationpdf/245_461.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Philip M. Genty, Incarcerated Parents and the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA): A Challenge for Correctional Services Providers, ICCA J. Community Corrections 42 (Nov. 2001).
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(E) (West 2003). Some states have adopted even shorter deadlines. See, e.g.,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12) (LexisNexis 2002); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a)(2) (West
2005).
58. See generally Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 176 (2004); Katherine A.
Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA 's Guidelines for the Termination of
Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879 (2001).
59. Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental
Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678 (2003).
60. See Philip M. Genty, Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues
and Recommendations, 77 CHILD WELFARE 543, 545 (1998). See generally Lanette P. Dailey, Imprisoned
Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1 (2000);
Heidi Rosenberg, Comment, California's Incarcerated Mothers: Legal Roadblocks to Reunification, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285 (2000); Pamela Lewis, Comment, Behind the Glass Wall: Barriers that
Incarcerated Parents Face Regarding the Care, Custody and Control of their Children, 19 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 97 (2004).
61. See Loene Trubkin, Go to Jail, Lose Your Kid: Mothers Incarcerated Too Long are Stripped of
Parental Rights (2005) (surveying case law) (unpublished student paper on file with author).
62. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-604(l)(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2004); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.447(6)(1) (West 2004).
63. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(s) (West 2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann
§ 2151.414(E)(13) (LexisNexis 2002).
64. See, e.g., Denise Johnston & Michael Carlin, When Incarcerated Parents Lose Contact with Their
Children, 6 CCIP J (2004), http://e-ccip.org/joumal.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
65. See Trubkin, supra note 61.
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prevalence of single incarcerated mothers, their children have a greater
probability of being in foster care than do male inmates.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services66 rejected any requirement that a
state must provide a parent with an attorney in termination proceedings, although
many states provide an attorney for the court appearance. However, often such
appointment occurs well after the need arises for the mother to connect with her
child and the foster care system. The difficulty for incarcerated parents to contact
foster parents, social workers, child protection agencies, and others responsible
for parental rights determinations can be daunting without an attorney. Attempts
to require the state to provide such legal advice in a correctional setting, if not
otherwise legislatively mandated, have not proved successful. Glover v.
Johnson67 held that the fundamental right of access to courts did not require the
state to provide legal assistance for inmates in connection with custody matters.
Thus, unless a local bar association or law school provides pro bono services to
women to undertake representation or simply to provide a contact with the
woman's attorney or foster care mother, incarcerated women have a difficult time
of meeting reunification plans. Similarly, if a parent is incarcerated in another
state, there appears to be near unanimous agreement that her presence is not
required at the termination proceeding so long as she is represented by counsel. 6s
In several states, statutes require that child welfare agencies provide
reunification services to incarcerated parents,69 but some claim that this
requirement is often ignored. In order to escape from ASFA, many advocates on
behalf of incarcerated mothers work to avoid foster care placements by the use of
guardianships, which also requires legal assistance. Some programs also attempt
70to provide services in cases where the children are at risk of foster placements.
Keeping a child out of governmental supervision may also have the benefit of
eliminating any later attempts to recoup payment from incarcerated mothers for
such services, an issue that arises with some regularity.7
Usually, state and federal foster care systems offer cash payments to non-
relatives to care for children placed in foster care. In reality, however, many of
these children are not placed in the homes of strangers but with their relatives
66. 452 U.S. 18(1981).
67. 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 816 (1996).
68. See in re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z980001, 748 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Md. App. 2000).
69. See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(e)(1) (West 1998); see also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 384-
b(2)(b), (7)(f) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2006). See generally Cristine H. Kim, Case Note, Putting Reason Back
Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287 (1999).
70. Women's Prison Association has a number of programs aimed at women offenders and their
children, described at www.wpaonline.org. For more descriptions, see also services of Chicago Legal Advocacy
for Incarcerated Mothers, identified at www.c-l-a-i-m.org and those of Legal Services for Prisoners with
Children, listed at www.prisonerswithchildren.org.
71. See generally Jessica Pearson, Building Debt While Doing Time: Child Support and Incarceration,
JUDGES' J., Winter 2004 at 5 ; Drew A. Swank, Enforcing the Unenforceable: Child Support Obligations of the
Incarcerated, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 61 (2003).
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who are willing to provide temporary care as "kinship care" providers 72 Yet even
if relatives want to provide a home for the children they may not be able to afford
this luxury, since similar payments are often not available to kinship caregivers. 3
For example, Lipscomb v. Simmons74 upheld an Oregon statute that provided aid
to foster parents who were not related to their foster children, but denied state aid
to foster parents who were related to their foster children. Changes in welfare
laws, mandated by the passage in 1996 of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),75 make it even more difficult for
relatives to obtain the financial support necessary to care for these children.
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) not only removes any
entitlement to benefits but also imposes time limits on eligibility for benefits.
Similarly, relatives may not necessarily be able to adopt children to keep them
within the extended family.
76
Despite a mother's incarceration, even a damaged parent-child relationship is
likely to be better than no relationship.77 Ironically, the substance abuse problem
that is a significant reason for a mother being incarcerated often cannot be easily
treated in the community prior to arrest. For example, in one survey, less than ten
percent of child welfare agencies were able to find substance abuse treatment
programs for most of their clients within thirty days.78 We assume these children
will have a better place to live, while the numbers tell us there are not enough
foster care parents or homes for adoptions, particularly for children who are not
infants.79 Parental bonds are blithely severed without checking to see if anything
72. See generally REPORT To THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP FOSTER CARE, JUNE 2000, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES ADMINISTRATION ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES CHILDREN'S BUREAU, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/kinr2c00/index.htm (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
73. See Susan Phillips and Barbara Bloom, In Whose Best Interest? The Impact of Changing Public
Policy on Relatives Caring for Children with Incarcerated Parents, 77 CHILD WELFARE 531, 536-38 (Sept/Oct
1998).
74. 962 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
75. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 115, 110 Stat. 2105.
76. See Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding a biological connection, standing
alone, did not give grandparent a constitutionally protected liberty interest in adoption of a grandchild).
77. Philip M. Genty, Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents in Termination of Parental
Rights Proceedings: A Fifty-State Analysis, 30 J. FAM. L. 757, 804 (1991-92).
78. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND BUILDING COMMON GROUND:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD PROTECTION 80 (1999), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/subabuse99/subabuse.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
79. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Admin. For Children and Families, Adoption and Foster
Care Analysis and Reporting System, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-researchlafcars/tar/report
10.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The preliminary fiscal year 2003 estimates as of April 2005
shows nearly 120,000 children waiting an average of forty-four months for adoption from the public foster care
system. Id. Further, 50,000 were adopted in 2003 and 68,000 children in foster care had their parental rights
terminated for all living parents. Id. Of the children adopted, the mean waiting time after termination was
sixteen months. Id. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS
STATES Focus ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING BARRIERS REMAIN,
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is substituted in their place. Indeed, states that aggressively promote adoptions
from foster care are rewarded with large bonuses from the federal government. s
Yet, for older children who have bonded with their parent, the trauma of
separation is compounded by the fact that termination may result in severing their
ties with their mothers, siblings, grandparents, and relatives without substituting
any new relationships in their place. Foster care is not a panacea. Many of these
children will face multiple placements.
Obviously, some foster care arrangements are better for children than
remaining in dysfunctional families, but it would be naive to think that being
shuttled among strangers is always preferable to remaining with family. For
example, a Bureau of Justice Statistics survey found eighty-seven percent of
female prisoners who spent their childhood in foster care or institutions reported
being physically or sexually abused 8' Since substance abuse and marginalized
school and job performance are often associated with low self-esteem that may
result from physical and sexual abuse, some placements put children at more risk
than staying with a parent who is obtaining supervised treatment.82 Anecdotally,
since the increase in ASFA termination, some children who have aged out of
foster care are attempting to find the mothers and families who no longer have
legal ties to them. The Children of Incarcerated Parents Bill of Rights includes
the "right to a lifelong relationship with my parent" and urges that jurisdictions
focus on rehabilitation for nonviolent offenders whose children are at risk of
becoming the responsibility of the state.83
After incarcerated mothers serve their sentences, the myriad collateral
consequences of incarceration threaten reintegration of their families. 4 Even if a
REPORT No. GAO-02-585 (June 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02585.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
80. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 673b(d)(1) (West 2003); Nev Moore, Adoption Bonuses: The Money Behind the
Madness, MASS. NEWS, http://www.massnews.comlpast-issues/2000/5_May/mayds4.htm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, DCF
LEADS THE NATION IN ADOPTION EFFORTS, RECEIVES $3.5M FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR INCREASING
ADOPTIONS OF FOSTER CHILDREN (2005), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/news/3.5madoptions.shtml (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
81. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY INMATES
AND PROBATIONERS 2 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/parip.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
82. A related issue in state court is the increase of charges against women for child endangerment arising
solely from their abuse in a domestic violence setting. Even if the mother is not criminally charged, in some
jurisdictions neglect proceedings have become routine. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153,
163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (enjoining such proceedings). New York State Court of Appeals clarified that neglect is
not established solely when a child has witnessed the mother's domestic abuse in Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820
N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2004).
83. S.F. PARTNERSHIP FOR INCARCERATED PARENTS, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS: A BILL
OF RIGHTS (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.centerforce.org/families/bill-of-rights.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
84. See generally NATASHA A. FROST, ET AL., INSTITUTE ON WOMEN & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HARD HIT:
THE GROWTH IN THE IMPRISONMENT OF WOMEN, 1977-2004 (2006), available at http://www.wpaonline.
org/institute/hardhit/HardHitReport4.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); LENORA LAPIDUS, ET AL.,
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single mother avoids termination of parental rights, in a majority of states she
may be denied federal cash assistance and food stamps due to her drug-related
felony conviction" as well as denied public housing8 or assistance to pay for
private housing and educational benefits." Conditions of her release, such as
work and drug treatment, typically take no account of her child care
responsibilities, resulting in ever increasing numbers of women being
incarcerated for technical violations, not new crimes. Some judges may even
require the female to notify her employer of her criminal history.88 Deportation89
or inability to return to the United States9° may also occur in some cases,
depending upon the crime, regardless of whether her child is a citizen.
Rational sentencing policy would include a cost benefit analysis weighing
the reasons favoring imprisonment of nonviolent mothers against the risk that
such maternal incarceration is more likely to devastate the lives of innocent
children and produce a new generation of criminals than to serve valid public
safety concerns. Pre-Guidelines and mandatory minimums, many of these
women were prime candidates for probation and would have resided with their
children in the community. Today, they populate federal prisons, with their
children shuttled to relatives, friends, and foster care, while they await the all too
frequent termination of their parental rights. The few community correctional
facilities designed to avoid this fate by letting mothers reside with their young
children while providing them gender-specific substance abuse treatment and
parenting classes, cannot begin to accommodate the women offender population.
CAUGHT IN THE NET: THE IMPACT OF DRUG POLICIES ON WOMEN AND FAMILIES (2004), available at
http://nicic.org/Misc/URLShell.aspx?SRC--Catalog&REFF=http://nicic.org/Library/020392&ID--020392&TYP
E-PDF&URL-http://www.fairlaws4families.org/final-caught-in-the-net-report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE
IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF SELECTED BENEFITS (GAO-05-238 Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05238.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); URBAN
INSTITUTE, PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN,
FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2004); Ann
L. Jacobs, Give 'Em a Fighting Chance: Women Offenders Reenter Society, 16 CRIM. JUST. 44 (2001).
85. See generally PATRICIA ALLARD, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE BENEFITS To WOMEN
CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/9088.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
86. See generally Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access
to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545 (2005).
87. See generally Kylie Beth Crawford, Comment, Collateral Sanctions in Higher Education: A
Constitutional Challenge to the Drug-Free Student Loan Provision of the Higher Education Act of 1998, 36 U.
TOL. L. REV. 755 (2005).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting notification
requirement where it was not shown to be reasonably necessary to protect the public).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Hemandez, 325 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing downward
departure granted to avoid deportation and separation from defendant's children who were citizens).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Manasrah, 347 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (granting, in part, a
pre-Booker family ties departure where an abusive husband threatened to leave country with children, and
defendant might not be permitted to return due to her felony conviction).
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For example, California has recently developed a phased housing plan to shift
4500 female offenders to community-based facilities,9' but it is unclear how long
it will take to implement this program. Moreover, eligibility often applies only to
women who in the past would have served their sentences on probation in the
community. Post-Booker one can only hope that added judicial discretion and the
reasonableness review of sentences will reverse the unbearably heartless and
destructive approach to families inherent in the Guidelines sentencing matrix,
which rejects any consideration of the gendered realities of most women
offenders.
V. BOOKER'S IMPACT ON How JUDGES DETERMINE SENTENCES
A. Variations About the Weight Given to the Guidelines in Sentencing
The Booker revolution has two components. First, Justice Stevens's majority
opinion applied Blakely v. Washington92 to the Guidelines, subjecting them to
jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Second, Justice Breyer's
majority remedial opinion held the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but are
now "effectively advisory. 93 Justice Breyer emphasized that the sentencing court
is required to consider the Guidelines ranges, but can "tailor the sentence in light
of other statutory concerns as well," 94 citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the
Breyer opinion excised the de novo standard for review of downward departures,
which was imposed by the Protect Act and the Feeney Amendment, effective in
October 2003. 9' In its place, Booker substituted "unreasonableness" as the proper
standard for reviewing all sentencing decisions.96
Booker generated significant disagreements about the role that the advisory
Guidelines should play in fashioning a sentence. Justice Breyer's mandate that
judges "must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing" 97 was interpreted in several ways. Judge Cassell indicated "in all
future sentencings, the court will give heavy weight to the Guidelines in
determining an appropriate sentence. In the exercise of its discretion, the court
will only depart from those Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly identified and
91. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION GENDER RESPONSIVE
PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS, available at http://www.corr.ca.gov/Communications/
ocs/GRPAccomplishments.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also TASK FORCE ON CALIFORNIA
PRISON CROWDING 3 (NCCD, 2006) (indicating nearly 5900 incarcerated women were eligible for community
placement), available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2006 ca taskforce.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
92. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
93. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
94. Id. at 245-46.
95. Pub. L. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670 (2003), codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp.
2005).
96. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
97. Id. at 264.
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persuasive reasons." 98 In contrast, Judge Adelman took exception to this approach
as being inconsistent with Booker99 and viewed the restrictions on considering a
defendant's characteristics found in section 5H1 as incompatible with the
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to consider the "history and characteristics of
the defendant." In Judge Adelman's view, "courts not imposing sentences within
the advisory guideline range should provide an explanation for their decision,"
but were not bound to follow the old "'departures' methodology" and "need not
justify a sentence outside of them."'"''
In United States v. Phelps,"'1 Judge Collier suggested a middle approach in
which departures become relevant only if they implicate one of the enumerated
purposes or objectives of sentencing. 0 2 In other words,
the Court will not consider itself bound by the provisions of U.S.S.G.
§ 5H in exercising the discretion afforded by Booker. Nevertheless, the
Court declines to treat §§ 3553(a)(1) and 3661 as giving defendants carte
blanche to argue for a sentence based upon a full range of offender
characteristics as such.
10 3
In another case, he utilizes a three step methodology: 1) apply the relevant
Guidelines; 2) look to the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a)(2); and 3) "determine
a reasonable sentence in accordance with § 3553(a), including but not limited to
considering the relevant Guidelines range.'"'4 While this approach appears to
require justification as to why a Guidelines sentence is greater than necessary to
comply with the stated objectives of sentencing, it does not preclude a non-
Guidelines sentence. For example, after Phelps, Judge Collier imposed a non-
Guidelines sentence for a sixty-nine-year-old wheelchair bound woman who had
serious health problems, because the 5H11.4 departure for physical condition was
inapplicable since it required a showing that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would
be unable to accommodate the defendant's need.'05 Judge Adelman has also
refined his sentencing practice to reflect a three-step approach, explicitly
recognizing that after the sentencing range is identified, step two requires a
determination from the Commission's policy statements of whether departures
"clearly apply," before reaching the appropriate sentence in light of the § 3553(a)
factors. 106
98. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005).
99. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986-87 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
100. Id. at 987.
101. 366 F. Supp. 2d 580, 593 (ED. Tenn. 2005).
102. Id. at 593.
103. Id. at 592-93.
104. United States v. Seiber, 2005 WL 1801614, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2005).
105. Id. at *3, *5.
106. United States v. Johnson, 2005 WL 1788784, at *1 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
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A number of circuits have now weighed in on a variety of Booker issues.
However, as noted in a recent opinion, achieving agreement has "unfortunately,
been like trying to herd bullfrogs into a wheelbarrow."' 7 Post-Booker, courts are
not even consistent in their use of terminology, with the Seventh Circuit asserting
that framing the review issue around departures is obsolete.' 8 Indeed, Justice
Stevens's dissent from the remedial opinion pointed out that "Congress' demand
in the PROTECT Act that departures from the Guidelines be closely regulated
and monitored is eviscerated-for there can be no 'departure' from a mere
suggestion."' 9 Generally, when a Guidelines sentence is rejected, most judges
now speak of imposing a non-Guidelines sentence or a Booker departure."0
Even with appellate guidance, a substantial amount of variation exists in how
much weight district court judges are giving the Guidelines. This occurs despite
the fact that appellate courts are still giving great weight to the Guidelines,
because they are also giving deference to sentencing judges who impose non-
Guidelines sentences, with the following caveats: 1) the trial judge must explain
the sentencing decision in light of the statutory factors and 2) if the sentence
varies dramatically from the Guidelines range, the judge must demonstrate
substantial reasons for the difference.
Typically, the circuits are affirmatively requiring the trial courts to determine
the correct Guidelines range,"' as well as the authority to depart ' 2 before
imposing any sentence. For example, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that
Booker did not return complete pre-Guidelines sentencing discretion to judges,
and it is error to treat the Guidelines as entirely defunct."3 Similarly, in United
States v. Hughes,"4 Judge Wilkins interpreted Booker as mandating that "a
district court shall first calculate (after making the appropriate findings of fact)
the range prescribed by the Guidelines. Then, the court shall consider that range
as well as other relevant factors set forth in the guidelines and those factors set
forth in § 3553(a) before imposing the sentence.""' 5
107. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006).
108. United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2005).
109. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 301 (2005).
110. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting non-Guidelines
sentence be used instead of departure); see also McBride, 434 F.3d at 476.
111. See, e.g., McBride, 434 F.3d at 476; United States v. Baretz, 411 F.3d 867, 878 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 276, 163 L.Ed.2d 246
(2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005).
112. See, e.g., McBride, 434 F.3d at 476; Haack, 403 F.3d at 1002; Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113. See also
United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1183
(11 th Cir. 2005).
113. United States v. Rennicke, 132 F. App'x 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2005).
114. 396 F.3d 374, 378-79 (4th Cir. 2005).
115. Id
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Post-Booker, discretionary denials of departures are still unreviewable,"6 but
either party can challenge the reasonableness of the sentence, which includes the
district court's refusal to sentence below the applicable Guidelines range."'
Therefore, the defendant can now challenge the excessiveness of a Guidelines
sentence as being unreasonable given the totality of the § 3553(a) factors."8 As a
result, the significance of obtaining a departure becomes less critical, although as
a practical matter, it is still essential for a defendant to obtain a sentence lower
than the applicable Guidelines range. In other words, the procedural posture of
the case has a significant impact on the appellate court's reasonableness analysis.
Using a deferential standard of review, it is much easier to find reasonableness of
a lower sentence imposed by the trial court, than to find that a sentence within the
Guidelines range is unreasonable. For example, in United States v. Gipson, 119 the
Seventh Circuit held that the District Court did not act unreasonably by refusing
to depart downward from the Guidelines range based on the differential in
punishment for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine.'
Regardless of whether a judge is willing to disregard the Guidelines based on
a more holistic view of the defendant's life history, family obligations, and the
absence of any perceived need for incarceration or a lengthy sentence, or believes
that the Sentencing Commission has adequately reflected all of the sentencing
factors that are contained in the Sentencing Reform Act, the same departure
analysis is required. First, the defendant must be shoehorned into the current
departure scheme, and second, all other factors that could decrease the sentence
must be presented in order to support the appropriateness of a non-Guidelines
sentence and to preserve the issue of "reasonableness" for appeal. However,
while probation officers submit presentence reports based on the Guidelines
factors, some may be open to counsel's suggestion to recommend that the court
use its discretion to impose a lower sentence than provided by the Guidelines. 2'
In fact, one of many unresolved post-Booker issues is the role of the probation
officer in recommending a sentence. The federal Guidelines changed the
orientation of probation officers from social workers to number crunchers. Now
their role in sentencing also bears rethinking.
If the district court is open to considering the Guidelines as a jumping off
point to argue for an appropriate sentence, while apparently the applicability of a
116. See, e.g., McBride, 434 F.3d at 476; United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1246-47 (11 th Cir.
2005).
117. McBride, 434 F.3d at 476.
118. Id. at475-76.
119. 425 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding the 100-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was not unreasonable
and passed muster under Booker).
120. Gipson, 425 F.3d at 337.
121. Cf United States v. Manasrah, 347 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (granting a pre-Booker
departure for family ties where court noted that probation officer stated that "but for the guidelines, her office
would recommend probation").
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Guidelines departure must be determined, the court need not dwell on the
correctness of a questionable departure. In other words, the Second Circuit has
added the welcome qualification that if a close question exists as to the precise
meaning or application of a policy statement authorizing a departure, "a judge
who has considered policy statements concerning departures need not
definitively resolve such questions if the judge has fairly decided to impose a
non-Guidelines sentence."'22 The Eighth Circuit has also adopted this view,
recognizing that "there may be situations where sentencing factors may be so
complex, or other § 3553(a) factors may so predominate, that the determination
of a precise sentencing range may not be necessary or practical."' 23 However,
judges must still identify potential applicable ranges, the reason why a specific
range is not being selected, and other § 3553(a) factors that predominate.'24 Since
most of the departures relating to females found in section 5H of the Guidelines
are discouraged and require exceptional circumstances, making their
appropriateness questionable, this provides a more flexible approach for reaching
the ultimate sentence.
In all other departure cases, despite the Guidelines being discretionary, the
lawyers, judges, and probation officers are still going through the complicated
ritual of determining the Guidelines sentence before the court can use its
discretion to disregard the particular case as not being reasonable. Ultimately,
requiring courts to calculate non-routine departures appears to inhibit the
granting of a non-Guidelines sentence because it continues to atomize the
sentencing decision, rather than permitting counsel to focus on the overall
narrative of the defendant that supports a lower sentence. Arguing several
departures in a piecemeal fashion has the disadvantage of some potentially being
applicable and others not, which means that a lower sentence can be justified
under the Guidelines, just not as low as what counsel believes is reasonable. In
other words, some judges will still be more likely to give lower sentences only if
they can fit within the existing departure case law. Thus, if judges believe the
Guidelines are too harsh, yet are uncomfortable rejecting them, they may decide
that a non-Guidelines sentence is unwarranted because the Guidelines departure
result is close enough for government work. While some departures might permit
the same result as a non-Guidelines sentence, the point framework inherent in
departures works against the more holistic reasonableness approach to deciding
non-Guidelines sentences.
The better solution is to require only traditional departures to be evaluated,
rather than discussing the applicability of discouraged departures requiring
exceptional circumstances. In this way, the offender's Guidelines sentence would
take into account all of the factors found to be applicable by the Sentencing
122. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005).
123. Haack, 403 F.3d at 1003.
124. Id.
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Commission, but would be free to treat all other departures, typically found in
sections 5H1 or 5K, without regard to the departure jurisprudence that is hostile
to extraordinary departures. In other words, there should be no requirement that
discouraged departures must be separately determined. Requiring calculation of
all departures simply duplicates the Guidelines result and discourages the
granting of non-Guidelines sentences based on the additional factors that Booker
has legitimized.
It is unclear whether conceding that a departure is not applicable has any
negative impact on the appeal. Certainly, the overall use of this technique may be
a negative influence in developing defense friendly departure jurisprudence.
Again, this poses problems as to those judges who will not often deviate from the
narrow departure case law, even though they have the discretion to do so. The
post-Booker sentencing statistics clearly suggest that relatively few judges are
mavericks. Judge Adelman is one of those who recognizes that many proffered
departures are unwarranted under the departure case law, yet is willing to fashion
non-Guidelines sentences that reflect "the nature of the offense, the history of the
defendant, and the needs of the public and any victims"'25 based on the
compelling personal histories of the defendants he sentences.
26
Other judges have not rushed to join him, and the bad departure case law can
be expected to continue to play a dominant role in sentencing. For example, in
United States v. Palma,127 a female drug and money courier for her uncle, who
apparently received no financial gain from her activities, combined requests for
departure based on her cultural history, duress, and coercion exacerbated by her
vulnerability and the influence of her uncle, her aberrant behavior, her frailty,
and her children.' 2s The judge admitted that she was genuinely remorseful, had no
criminal history, and did "not appear to do much more than work to support her
two children and take care of them .... She does not frequent bars, and does not
do drugs or drink alcohol.' 29 The judge also recognized how lamentable her
predicament was. Yet, he responded that he doubted the Tenth Circuit would
uphold such departures and that the Guidelines indicate that, "even in the most
difficult and justifiably sympathy-evoking area, courts should depart downward
only in rare cases."'3 ° Then in a cursory footnote, the judge rejected her request
for a non-Guidelines sentence.' The only reason for that result, other than a pro
125. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 05-CR-80, 2005 WL 1788784, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July 25,
2005).
126. See, e.g., id. at *2-3 (denying departures for mental abuse, family ties, and totality of
circumstances, in favor of a non-Guidelines sentence based on horrific child abuse, mental health, and substance
abuse issues, and involvement with abusive men, where her failure to surrender was caused by her depression
about wanting to be with her children during the holidays).
127. 376 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. N.M. 2005).
128. Id. at 1206.
129. Id. at 1208.
130. Id. at 1213.
131. Id. at 1222 n.5.
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forma mention of § 3553, appears to be his previous statement that she had
benefited because her plea was to a charge that carried a statutory maximum that
was fifty percent lower than the Guidelines sentence.' 32 However, the statutory
sentence should have been the start, not the finish of the non-Guidelines analysis.
This type of sentencing belies the promise that Booker would generally result
in the exercise of more judicial discretion as to sympathetic defendants, though it
may yet prove a true test of whether the appellate court will agree that the
maximum applicable sentence she received is reasonable, given the trial court's
complete disregard of that issue. 3 3 To paraphrase Mark Twain's oft-repeated
quote, "the reports of the Sentencing Guidelines' death have been greatly
exaggerated."
B. Reviewing Sentences for Reasonableness
The application of Booker's undefined "reasonableness" standard permits
every defendant and prosecutor to appeal a sentence not required by a plea
agreement on the grounds that it is unreasonable. Some circuits have agreed with
the Seventh Circuit's view that a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline
range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, with the farther
the sentence departs from the Guidelines, the more compelling the § 3553(a)
must be.'- However, this does not provide an automatic pass for all Guidelines
sentences because such an interpretation flies in the face of making the
Guidelines discretionary and permitting judges to rely on § 3553(a). The
introduction to that section specifically states that "[t]he court shall impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes"
set forth in paragraph (2) of the Act. Those purposes include just punishment,
deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation, while the mandatory Guidelines
emphasized just desserts and long sentences. Thus, the directive to consider all of
the stated purposes as well as the defendant's characteristics, which is
specifically mentioned in section 3553(a)(1), seems to render post-Booker
Guidelines sentences open to reasonableness challenges. Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that the court lacks jurisdiction to
review a Guidelines sentence for reasonableness.' "
Moreover, Justice Breyer referenced 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which says that "[n]o
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
132. Id. at 1219-21.
133. See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (remanding for
resentencing where judge did not address the defendant's main argument for a lower sentence).
134. United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari to determine how Guidelines sentences affect the reasonableness review. See Claiborne v.
United States, 2006 WL 2187967 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006); Rita v. United States, 2006 WL 2307774 (U.S. Nov. 3,
2006).
135. See United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006).
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United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." To the extent the Guidelines do not permit such
information to be used for departures, it would appear contrary to a discretionary
approach to reasonableness. Post-Booker, mechanical Guidelines sentences can
be challenged by arguing that the trial court did not exercise its required
discretion in fashioning the sentence. In other words, it is questionable whether a
judge exercises judicial discretion by simply relying on a mandatory scheme that
the Supreme Court has held is not constitutional in its current form. Indeed,
Judge Posner remanded a case for resentencing where the defendant contended
that a Guidelines sentence was unreasonable. In light of the defendant's long
history of psychiatric illness and marijuana use, the trial judge's "rote statement"
that he considered all relevant factors did not indicate that he considered the
defendant's argument in a reasoned exercise of discretion.'
36
Arguably, lengthy Guidelines sentences for female nonviolent offenders with
little or no prior criminal history, significant family obligations, and/or
backgrounds that encouraged submission to their male intimates, should not
survive a reasonableness review in the absence of a mandatory minimum or case
specific factors justifying the term. However, the circuits appear timid in their
new-found discretion. The Seventh Circuit has clearly signaled that it will be rare
when a Guidelines sentence is unreasonable. 3 7 Post-Booker, displeasure with the
Guidelines is not by itself an adequate reason for lowering a sentence, 38 and even
the few judges who have significantly lowered Guidelines sentences in crack
cocaine cases have still imposed lengthy terms of incarceration.3 9
Sometimes the reasonableness review produces unusual results, such as in
United States v. Lazenby,'4° where the Eighth Circuit reversed a downward
variance of eighty-three percent below the bottom of a Guidelines sentence as
unreasonable, despite the defendant's significant rehabilitative efforts to reunite
with her children because the sentence did not adequately reflect the seriousness
of the drug offense.'4' Yet at the same time, it also reversed a much lengthier
sentence of another female co-conspirator as unreasonable because it did not take
into account the disparity between the two women's sentences for similar
conduct and the second female's role in obtaining guilty pleas from others.
42
Indeed, Lazenby stands virtually alone as reversing a departure for ostensibly
136. United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
137. United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that 115-month
sentence was unreasonable for being a felon in possession of a weapon).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting sentence outside the
advisory Guidelines based solely on the rejection of the disparate treatment between crack and powder cocaine).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11 th Cir. 2006) (affirming sentence of
ninety months, instead of the Guidelines sentence of 188 to 235 months for selling $350 of crack cocaine).
140. 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006).
141. Id. at 932-33.
142. Id. at 933-34.
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being too low, but the extreme disparity appears to have occurred because
different judges sentenced the two women, and the appellate court clearly found
that the more culpable defendant was given the lower sentence.
4 3
Judicial discretion is also limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), which requires a
district court that imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines range to state the
specific reason for the imposition of a different sentence in its written order. This
permits appellate courts to monitor sentences they deem inappropriate by
remanding for further clarification before undertaking their reasonableness
review. This requirement applies whether or not the sentence results from a
Guidelines departure or non-Guidelines sentence,' 44 though the Ninth Circuit has
permitted citation of factually similar cases and comparison of departure levels of
cases to satisfy this requirement. 4 5 While reasonableness provides a way to
loosen the unyielding grip of Guidelines sentences, its promise has not yet been
realized.
C. Gendered Implications in the Reasonableness Review
The reasonableness challenges that will most likely implicate sentencing of
female offenders are: 1) claims by the defense that a sentence is unduly long,
either because it is mandated by the Guidelines, or a result of an upward
departure; and 2) claims by the prosecution that a sentence is unduly short,
usually as a result of allegedly unwarranted downward departures or a non-
Guidelines sentence. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in United States v.
Menyweather, 46 which typifies the second challenge, favors judicial discretion to
fashion more flexible sentences and should be argued as a model for other
circuits. It comes as no surprise that the case involves a female defendant who
kept getting a break from the sentencing judge. Pre-Booker, the trial judge gave
her an eight-level downward departure for mental and emotional condition,
diminished capacity, and extraordinary family circumstances, and had twice re-
imposed the same sentence after remands based in part on his insufficient
explanation of the departures, which the government argued were
inappropriate. 
47
When the Ninth Circuit finally heard Menyweather a third time, Booker
governed the analysis. The court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to
downwardly depart from the Guidelines, and if any error existed, it was harmless
in view of the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 4 8 While the
majority stated that if it were applying a de novo standard to the family ties
143. See id. at931-32.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2006).
145. See id. at 635-36.
146. 447 F.3d 625.
147. Id. at 627.
148. Id. at 628.
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departure it would have reversed, Menyweather held the sentence was reasonable
because the abuse of discretion standard applied to the district court's
determination of its departure authority, and the clearly erroneous standard
applied to factual findings.49 In the alternative, Menyweather held that any error
was harmless as a non-Guidelines Booker sentence, because previously
discouraged factors such as family ties could now be considered.50 In addition,
since two departures had been granted, when the court reviewed the
reasonableness of the extent of the departures, it combined them. Thus, since
both family ties and diminished capacity departures generally ranged between
one and four levels, a combined departure of eight levels was not unreasonable.'5'
Of course, while this analysis favors the defense when the judge is lenient, it
favors the prosecution when the judge is harsh.
Ironically, the defendant in Menyweather was not the most sympathetic or
representative female offender. She was an administrative employee at the
United States Attorneys Office, who embezzled more than $400,000 over several
years, part of which resulted in a loss to a travel agency that had to be made up
by the innocent travel agent.5 2 Menyweather's expert characterized her as
suffering from severe post-traumatic stress due to her abandonment by her
parents as a child and the violent murder of her fianc6, which occurred when she
was five months pregnant with their child,'53 and described her thefts as
compulsive coping behaviors. '54 In contrast, the government argued that she
"lived as a successful professional and parent with no psychological treatment for
eight years after the death of her fianc6 and before her embezzlement scheme
began.', 5 The family ties departure was based on her being the sole parent and
primary source of financial support for her eleven-year-old daughter.56 The judge
departed two levels lower than requested by the defense sentencing her to five
years of probation, conditioned on serving forty days on consecutive weekends in
"a jail-type institution," restitution, and 3000 hours of community service,
instead of a Guidelines sentence of twenty-one to twenty-seven months.'
7
Other circuits may not be as flexible. Even Menyweather noted that, post-
Booker, the legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de
novo. s5 Thus, a narrow circuit interpretation of a departure, such as single
parenthood not being extraordinary for family ties purposes, would seem to
149. Id. at 630, 633.
150. Id. at 634.
151. Id. at 635-36.
152. Id. at 637 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 628.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 632 n.5.
156. Id. at 628.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 630. See United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2005) (mentioning four
other circuits that applied the de novo standard to the legal interpretation of Guidelines sentences post-Booker).
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imply that without other facts supporting the departure, its application would be
incorrect under an abuse of discretion standard. Of course, post-Booker the court
can alternatively impose a lower sentence as a matter of its non-Guidelines
discretion. In fact, in United States v. Serrata,5 9 where improper family ties
departures were given to male defendants, the appellate court remanded for
imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence.
To avoid a remand, counsel should request the trial court to indicate that it
would grant the identical non-Guidelines sentence if the departure is rejected on
legal grounds by the appellate court. Otherwise, like Serrata, if a material error is
made in the Guidelines calculation, some circuits will remand for resentencing,
without reaching the issue of the reasonableness of the sentence in light of the
statutory factors.' 6 Moreover, this suggests that in all questionable departure
cases, it is incumbent on the defense to demonstrate all factors supporting a non-
Guidelines sentence. For instance, in United States v. Clark,16 1 Judge Luttig
rejected a comparison to lower state sentences as grounds to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence in the absence of unusual circumstance. 62 While Judge King
concurred in the judgment, he remarked that the factors before the judge would
have justified a non-Guidelines sentence. The trial judge had described Clark as
having no prior criminal history or propensity towards crime and "that she
probably would not have been involved in criminal activity but for her
boyfriend.' ' 63 In addition, she had not engaged in criminal activity since her
arrest, had secured employment, suggesting little need to deter future criminal
activity, and the judge had made obtaining a GED a condition of her probation. 6
Indeed, she sounds like the prototype of the females who are now referred to as
the "Girlfriend Problem,"' 65 discussed later in this article.
Predictably, circuits that have narrowly applied departures, appear to be
taking an equally constrained view of reasonableness, though it is unclear
whether they will be equally vigilant as to upward and downward departures.' 66
Generally, in this brave new world of discretionary federal sentencing, it is not a
given that federal judges who have long chafed over the lack of flexibility
imposed by the Guidelines will significantly lower sentences based on
individualized factors and their displeasure with the severity of many Guidelines
ranges. Judicial complaints about being unable to fashion a just sentence are
159. 425 F.3d 886, 913-15 (10th Cir. 2005).
160. See United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006).
161. 434 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2006).
162. Id. at 687.
163. Id. at 689.
164. Id.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 230-63.
166. United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2005) (remanding because explanation
of upward departure was not substantially compelling).
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61directed towards mandatory minimums as well as to the Guidelines matrix. '
Thus, despite Justice Scalia's belief that Booker presages "excessive sentencing
disparities" that will "wreak havoc" on the judicial system,'6s my initial
prognostications as to Booker hold true. A relatively low proportion of sentences
have been dramatically affected as a result of Booker, but judges appear more
willing to give nonviolent first offenders, who include many females, a break . 69
Similarly, more female defendants benefit when judges do not require
"extraordinary" circumstances for non-Guidelines sentences based on a
defendant's characteristics, but many judges are not exercising their Booker
discretion. A relative handful of district court judges are responsible for most of
the post-Booker gender related departure cases. In a post-Booker world,
sensitizing judges about gender related issues is key to obtaining just sentences
for more women offenders." ° Obviously, there will be circumstances, particularly
involving violent or habitual offenders,"' where the absence of a mandatory
sentencing scheme may disadvantage defendants when compared to the current
matrix, but for most women offenders, discretion is likely to be an advantage.
The remainder of this article will address how counsel can argue specific
issues that raise gendered implications at sentencing in light of Booker's more
flexible approach to factors that can be considered in rendering a fair sentence
that is not greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing.
VI. FACTORING CHILDREN INTO THE SENTENCING MIX
Even in a Guidelines regime, judges have had relative freedom to determine
where in the range to sentence an individual defendant."12 Some judges assume
that women offenders are bad mothers or focus on accountability, without
recognizing the underlying difficulties that may have led to a woman's substance
abuse or other nonviolent criminal activity. After Booker, counsel must educate
judges about non-intuitive gender related issues favoring maintenance of the
167. See, e.g., United States v. Hungerford, 2006 WL 2923703 (9th Cir. 2006) (Reinhardt, J. concurring
in judgment, condemning 159-year mandatory sentence for a fifty-two-year-old mentally disturbed woman with
no prior criminal record).
168. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 312-13 (2005).
169. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CASES SENTENCED SUBSEQUENT TO U.S. V. BOOKER 1, 15 (2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBookerl 11005.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
170. See NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, SENTENCING WOMEN OFFENDERS: A TRAINING CURRICULUM
FOR JUDGES (2000), http://nicic.org/Library/016419 (last visited July 15, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). The 2000 version is available on the website and the statistics were updated in 2003. Id.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Egenberger, 424 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming higher non-
Guidelines sentence imposed due to repeated fraudulent use of social security numbers and need to impress
seriousness of the matter on the defendant); United States v. Fogg, 409 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2005)
(affirming maximum sentence of twenty-four months for two misdemeanor larceny convictions based on
defendant's numerous convictions). Cf. United States v. Gasaway, No. 1:98 CR 72(1), 2005 WL 2284210, at
*5-6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005) (declining to resentence, where female defendant had very long record of drug
use and crimes relating to drug addiction, despite her employment success).
172. United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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family unit. Not only can counsel be more assertive in judicial argument, but also
in identifying these issues in plea negations with prosecutors, and with probation
officers, who in some cases may be willing not to oppose a reduced non-
Guidelines sentence. Indeed, in some cases, it may be possible to obtain a
stipulation to a non-Guidelines sentence. 173
Similarly, even without regard to Booker, when both parents face relatively
short sentences, judges can stagger the timing of the incarceration to
accommodate child-care obligations or permit a defendant to surrender after
nursing her infant to the child's first birthday. 74 Of course, judges may believe
that when a female has already received a break, a request for probation based on
childcare considerations justifies a lecture about her chutzpa.'75 However, it
should be remembered that sometimes when a wife is charged as a co-conspirator
with her husband, she might view the relationship as providing stability for her
children, rather than as a sign that she was not concerned that her children were
in close proximity to significant amounts of illegal substances. Indeed, her plea
of guilty to misprision of a felony in this circumstance may be a more accurate
reflection of her true role in the crime than any initial conspiracy charges brought
against her, which could have totaled forty years.
A. Section 5H1.6: Family Ties Departure
1. The Procedural Context
The most significant departure from a gendered perspective is section 5H1.6
addressing family ties, because women are typically the sole or primary
caretakers of their children. 76 As previously discussed, post-Booker in most
circuits, counsel must first determine if a family ties departure is appropriate
before arguing that a non-Guidelines sentence is warranted due to family
circumstances. In other words, if a departure can be granted, there is no need to
reject the Guidelines to impose an equitable sentence. Similar to the other
discouraged departures found in section 5H1 involving characteristics of the
defendant, a family ties departure requires a showing of exceptional
circumstances. However, after Booker, the de novo standard is only applicable to
reviewing the legal interpretation of the departure, not its application to the
173. See, e.g., United States v. Kee, 2005 WL 1162449, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005).
174. See Gao v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 2d 456, 461 (E.D. Va. 2005).
175. United States v. Garcia, No. SA-04-CR-404(2)-FB, 2005 WL 1683628, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 8,
2005) (denying a request for probation and noting the court would entertain a joint motion to set aside the plea
agreement and go to trial on the forty-year maximum cocaine counts, where defendant had been permitted to
plea guilty to misprision of a felony; probation request was based on fact that defendant would be in prison at
the same time as her husband).
176. Men are also eligible for this departure, and given their much larger numbers in sentencing, some
family ties cases involve male parents. Similarly, family ties are not limited to children, but that is their most
gendered application.
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particular case, which is governed by abuse of discretion. As a result, family ties
departure are more likely to be affirmed, although the definition of what is
exceptional is so narrow in some circuits as to render the departure inoperable in
most cases. Thus, its invocation is a necessary ritualistic first step, undertaken so
that the trial court can find the departure is unavailable, before proceeding to the
next step of determining the appropriateness of a non-Guidelines sentence based
on the same or additional factors. Ironically, this approach suggests the oddity of
counsel arguing either that a family ties departure is not available in order to
obtain a non-Guidelines sentence, or conversely, arguing it is available, but
requesting an alternative non-Guidelines sentence in case the appellate court
disagrees. In other words, an alternative finding as to a non-Guidelines sentence
is necessary to ward off a remand if the Court of Appeals rejects the departure
because it does not accord as much deference to the trial court's decision as given
in Menyweather. 171
2. The Family Ties Case Law
In 2003, section 5H1.6 was amended to make this departure even more
difficult to obtain. Although the Guidelines do not consider family ties as a
relevant departure factor, and several circuits have considered single mothers as
not extraordinary, additional requirements now apply: the caretaking loss is now
required to be "essential," exceeding the harm that ordinarily occurs, the parent
must be "irreplaceable," and the departure must effectively address the loss of
caretaking. As a result, courts may view this departure as applicable only if the
sentence results in no incarceration or one that is sufficiently short so that the
departure is not viewed as benefiting the mother more than the child.'78 Several
recent cases claim that the new requirements do not change the previous case
law,"'9 which may indicate why only 430 family ties departures were granted in
fiscal year 2003,180 and why the government was successful in six of its seven
appellate challenges to such departures in 2003.8 While this judicial view is
likely to be an accurate assessment in some circuits, other circuits had previously
been more flexible than the current interpretation mandates.
177. 447 F.3d 625, 631-33 (9th Cir. 2006); see supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Jebara, 313 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (imposing a split
sentence of five months imprisonment followed by home confinement, on the theory that the family could
adequately care for the children during that time, but not long term); United States v. Johnson, No. 05-CR-80,
2005 WL 1788784, at *2 (E.D. Wis. July 25, 2005) (denying section 5H1.6 departure, where other family
members were available and defendant owed time on her revocation sentence, granting non-Guidelines
departure).
179. Cf. Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 769 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing departure where care was
not irreplaceable).
180. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT tbl.25a (2003).
181. Id.attbl.58.
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Despite the added limitations, section 5H1.6 departures were being granted
pre-Booker, particularly where the children have significant medical or emotional
issues. '82 Similarly, a family ties departure was granted where the defendant's six
children would probably be placed in foster care, although due to the seriousness
of the crime in which the defendant was a lookout to a bank robbery, the court
still imposed an incarcerative sentence that might result in the children spending
some time in foster care.' 83 In United States v. Eisinger,1" the court denied a
family ties departure despite finding compelling circumstances and discussing
the family ties literature, instead granting the departure on other grounds.' It is
arguable that this route was taken to avoid an appeal of the section 5H1.6 issue.
Since the new section 5H1.6 criteria do not specifically identify single
parenting as an inappropriate factor, the circuits that have been favorable to
family ties departures still have the ability to affirm them. For example, the Sixth
Circuit recently affirmed a ten-level downward departure for a woman caring for
three children and one grandchild, where the children's father was incarcerated.
6
As previously discussed, Menyweather affirmed an eight-level departure, with a
flexible view concerning the feasibility of alternative care.'87 Given the strong
support for family ties departures long demonstrated by the Second Circuit, a
similar approach would not be surprising. Indeed, in one recent case a woman
who served eight months was granted a downward departure including no further
incarceration because no other family member could care for her four children
who had developed depression, separation anxiety, and post traumatic stress
disorder during her incarceration. 9 Yet, even in the Second Circuit, mere status
as a single mother of a four-year-old child was held not to justify a family ties
departure.' 90 Similarly, in another single mother case, although incarceration was
described as "a veritable train wreck for the children ... that does deeply trouble
182. See, e.g., United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming downward departure
for male who had critical role regarding autistic son, who was one of four children, even though defendant was
married); United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2004) (granting a departure to a male where two
of his children had cystic fibrosis and he was irreplaceable in their care); United States v. Davis, 2004 WL
1965698 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting a departure to a single mother of five children who developed severe
emotional and behavioral problems since learning of their mother's arrest and likely incarceration).
183. See United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
184. 321 F. Supp. 2d 997 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
185. Id. at 1005.
186. See United States v. Marine, 94 F. App'x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2004).
187. See 447 F.3d at 633; see supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Concepcion,
795 F. Supp. 1262, 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Removing the mother in such a matriarchal setting destroys the
children's main source of stability and guidance and enhances the possibility of their engaging in destructive
behavior," and later themselves becoming offenders.). For an extensive discussion of the earlier case law, see
Remember the Family, supra note 1; Gender and Sentencing, supra note 1.
189. United States v. Hemandez, No. 03 CR. 1257(RWS), 2005 WL 1330764, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2,
2005).
190. United States v. Mateo-Ruiz, 112 F. App'x 790, 792 (2d Cir. 2004)
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the Court,"' 9' nothing in the record took the case out of the heartland to justify a
departure.
More distressing, United States v. Burk92 denied a family ties departure to a
mother of a child who had an unusually severe case of autism, even though she
had a "central role in his care and treatment."'93 While the court recognized that
the defendant presented evidence that could have justified a downward departure,
it concluded the defendant failed to establish her case was exceptional.'94 The
court sentenced her to eight months for bank fraud based on punishing her for her
crime, "her prior pattern of fraudulent activity, [and her] failure to cooperate fully
with the presentence investigation.' 95 No discussion was given as to why a
community correctional facility, split sentence, or home confinement could not
have equally met the goals of sentencing. Moreover, the court refused to stay
imposition of the sentence, even though the defendant claimed that she needed
additional time to provide for a transition for her child to an alternative caretaker
and if no stay were granted she would likely serve her sentence before the appeal
was resolved. 1 6 To me, after Booker this result is shocking, but without a
presumption that children are a valid consideration in sentencing, we will
continue to see sentences that are more harmful to children than to the offender.
Eight months in the life of a vulnerable four-year-old is quite different than that
same time served by his mother.
Even the Second Circuit has signaled that care must still be taken to identify
the factors that make the case extraordinary. In United States v. Daidone,97 the
government argued that family circumstances were not sufficiently extraordinary
because of the availability of the father to help care for and support their four
children, two of whom have mental or emotional disorders. The appellate court
remanded the case for resentencing in light of Booker, suggesting that it would be
useful in determining the reasonableness of any sentence for the trial court to
more completely discuss its factual findings concerning the extent of the
children's emotional dependency on the mother, as well as whether other family
members could meet the children's needs, and the availability of other family to
provide financial support.'
98
191. United States v. Ochoa-Suarez, No. 03 CR. 747 JFK, 2005 WL 66889, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2005) (finding sentencing range of 151 to 188 months for forty-year-old single mother with infant who was first
offender charged with drug conspiracy), modified by United States v. Ochoa-Suarez, No. 03 CR. 747(JFK),
2005 WL 287400, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (applying a ten year mandatory minimum post-Booker).
192. 372 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Me. 2005).
193. Id. at 105.
194. Id. at 107.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 124 F. App'x 677 (2d Cir. 2005).
198. Id. at 680; see also United States v. Thomas, 181 F. App'x 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of
family ties departure of woman with seven children, whose father was also sentenced to imprisonment, and
whose children had no other family members to care for them).
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A few recent cases granting departures appear to be mixing section 5H1.6
terminology with non-Guidelines sentencing factors. For example, in United
States v. Rodriguez, where a representative of Child Protective Service testified
that additional incarceration would recommend termination of the mother's
parental rights, the judge departed to the statutory minimum, even though that
would still result in the loss of her children.' 99 Similarly, in United States v.
Capri,2° where the court departed for a mother whose children had special
medical and psychiatric conditions, noting that ordinarily is not never, it found
the departure reasonable under § 3553(a)(2), without designating it as an
alternative non-Guidelines sentence. 0 ' Indeed, the court rejected the prosecutor's
incredibly insensitive suggestion that availability of foster care was an adequate
alternative for caregivers. While these departures benefit the female defendants,
they are not true section 5H1.6 cases.
In 1996, Judge Weinstein generally referred to the current family ties policy
as "so cruelly delusive as to make those who have to apply the guidelines to
human beings, families, and the community want to weep."2°2 Unfortunately,
nearly ten years later little had changed, when in 2004, Judge Gertner similarly
characterized the case law prohibiting her from granting a departure based on the
defendant's family ties as "cruel."2 3 It is disheartening that this departure, which
has provided some relief to single mothers and their children, has been rendered
even less available without any real focus on weighty policy issues concerning
the children. The view that the family ties departure is a gender break for females
has overshadowed the reality that avoiding the needless disruption of the lives of
children is an appropriate sentencing factor for nonviolent offenders. Moreover,
the current departure approach ignores the fact that many women offenders suffer
trauma because of the separation from their children, with its attendant guilt and
recognition that their children may believe they have been abandoned and the
possibility that parental rights will be terminated. These concerns obviously have
negative effects on their rehabilitation. Studies indicate that family ties are a
strong indicator for successful reentry.2"
Assuming that Booker eliminates the problems caused by the bad family ties
case law is unrealistic. Many judges are not imposing lower non-Guidelines
sentences, and appellate courts will be loath to hold it is unreasonable to refuse to
199. United States v. Rodriguez, No. 8:03CR36, 2005 WL 1319259 *2, 5 (D. Neb. June 3, 2005).
200. No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720 (N.D. 111. July 5, 2005).
201. Id. at *7-8.
202. Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community, 5
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 169 (1996).
203. United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246,254 n.17 (D. Mass. 2004).
204. See JEREMY TRAVIS, ET AL., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
PRISONER REENTRY 39 (2001), available at http://www.urban.org/pdfs/from-prison to home.pdf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing studies). See generally Jeremy Travis, Families and Children, FED.
PROBATION, June 2005, at 31 (2005); Marsha M. Yasuda, Comment, Taking a Step Back: The United States
Supreme Court's Ruling in Overton v. Bazzetta, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1831 (2004).
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consider single parenthood and family responsibilities in sentencing, particularly
when sentences within the Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable and
discretionary refusals not to depart downward are unreviewable. °5 Similarly, the
reasonableness analysis for departures simply duplicates the trend of the pre-
Booker case law. In other words, whatever the circuit previously awarded is the
base-line for reasonableness. Thus, in stingy circuits, the extent of current
departures will likely be measured against earlier departures of fewer levels,
while in more generous circuits, the comparison will favor larger departures.
Indeed, it may require combining several departures, as in Menyweather,°6 to
justify an eight-level discount. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit recently noted when
reversing a sentence of six days in prison and three years of supervised release in
a drug conspiracy where the Guidelines indicated a minimum of forty-six months
imprisonment:
Nor does her status as a single mother, because the father of her child is
in jail, justify such an extreme variance. We are not insensitive to the
problems of incarcerating a single mother; doing so creates enormous
costs for an innocent child and for society at large. However, we cannot
find reasonable a sentencing decision that would effectively immunize
single mothers from criminal sanction aside from supervised release. Her
situation is, unfortunately, not very uncommon. The district court noted
this itself when it denied a downward departure on the basis of her
family times and responsibilities because it did not fall outside the
heartland of cases. Although these facts may justify some discrepancy
from the advisory guidelines range, they simply are not dramatic enough
to warrant such an extreme downward variance. As such the district
court's sentencing decision was unreasonable. 7
A recent article, while sympathetic to the plight of nonviolent women and
their children, suggests that family ties should not generally be considered at
sentencing because a more reasoned policy concerning drugs or nonviolent
offenders would obviate the need to rely on this disfavored factor.20 8 However,
the practical difficulty with such an approach is that sentencing has been
increasingly punitive for the last thirty years, and women offenders do not have
the luxury of waiting for a more rational sentencing policy while their children
grow up without them. The family ties departure still needs a Guidelines fix to
205. See, e.g., United States v. Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding the sentence of
a male defendant not unreasonable because it is within the Guidelines and also noting that the discretionary
decision not to depart downward for family ties is unreviewable).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 146-58.
207. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 596 (10th Cir. 2006).
208. See Dan Markel, et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, U. ILL. L. REV. 74-77
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id--933427#Paper Download (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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make such departures the norm for nonviolent parents who are the sole or
primary caretakers of their children. 209 This also is in line with results from a
survey that found approximately sixty percent of federal judges who responded
wanted more emphasis at sentencing placed on family ties of offenders. 2'0 The
sentencing presumption should be exactly the opposite of the present section
5H1.6 departure approach. Instead of a discouraged departure requiring
extraordinary circumstances that downplays the importance of sole and primary
parenting, a departure for nonviolent parents should ordinarily be granted unless
good cause exists to deny it. Courts should factor in barriers to visiting, including
the parent's distance from home when determining the extent of a departure in
order to give voices to the children who are currently excluded from the
Guidelines matrix. 21 ' The Sentencing Commission should reanalyze its parenting
policy, instead of continuing to view the Guidelines as untouched by the seismic
shift of power Booker portends.
B. Fashioning a Non-Guidelines Approach Favoring Family Ties
It is a sorry commentary on America's family values when the privation that
female offenders face to maintain their family ties is considered ordinary.
Professor Berman has suggested that the introductory language in a recent House
Resolution stating that "the rights of parents ought to be strengthened whenever
possible as they are the cornerstone of American society" should be viewed by
post-Booker courts as an invitation to exercise their discretion to give greater
consideration to parental responsibilities in departure decisions.22 While the
resolution arose in the context of parental complaints about sex education in
elementary school education, dicta in several Supreme Court cases support this
sentiment more broadly. For example, Justice O'Connor's plurality in Troxel v.
Granville,"3 rejecting the right of grandparents to obtain visitation objected to by
the child's mother, observed, "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court. 21 4 Similarly, Stanley v. Illinois,2 5 a case requiring that
an unwed father be given a fitness hearing before his children could be taken
209. See Remember the Family, supra note I (suggesting revision to section 5H1.6).
210. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT: SURVEY OF ARTICLE IM
JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf
(Exhibits I-19 and IM-19 showed respectively fifty-nine percent of district judges and sixty-three percent of
circuit judges wanted more emphasis on family ties) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 212-29 (arguing for parenting to be considered in sentencing).
212. See H.R. 547, 109th Congress, 1st Sess. (2005) (finding that Ninth Circuit deplorably infringed on
parental rights in Fields v. Palmdale School District), discussed at http://sentencing.typepad.comlsentencing-
lawand-policy/2005/1 1/a_new_argument_.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
213. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
214. Id. at 65.
215. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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from him in a dependency proceeding, asserted:
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The
rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
"essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67
L.Ed. 1042 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), and
"(r)ights far more precious.., than property rights," May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953).
Stanley also recognized that the "integrity of the family unit has found
protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth
Amendment ... Santosky v. Kramer27 imposed a clear and convincing
evidence standard before a state can terminate parental rights, opining that
"[s]ome losses cannot be measured. 21 8 In Santosky, a finding of permanent
neglect "effectively foreclosed the possibility that Jed would ever know his
natural parents."29
The response to this line of cases is likely to be that prisoners lose many of
their rights as a consequence of incarceration. 220 However, that begs the question
of whether such consequences are appropriate to be considered in the sentencing
221context. For example, in United States v. Meyers the Second Circuit recently
vacated a condition of supervised release that prevented an unwed male child
pornography defendant from visiting with his natural son in foster care without
pre-approval of the Probation Office. While the decision did not categorically
hold this condition unconstitutional because it lacked a detailed record of why
the condition had been imposed, Meyers recognized that given the fundamental
liberty interest implicated by the sentencing condition, it must be reasonably
necessary and the deprivation narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.222 If it is potentially unconstitutional to interfere with
visitation under supervised release, it hardly seems a stretch that family ties
should be considered relevant to the reasonableness of the original sentence.223
216. Id.
217. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
218. Id. at760-61 n.il.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133-36 (2003) (affirming limitation on contact visits);
Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that most attributes of marriage, including
bearing and raising children, do not survive imprisonment), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002).
221. 426 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2005).
222. Id. at 125-26.
223. United States v. Smith, 436 F.3d 307 (1st Cir. 2006), is distinguishable. Smith held that a condition
of supervised release requiring the defendant to stay away from his natural minor daughter without permission
of the Probate Court was not an abuse of discretion. In Smith the defendant and the mother of his child were not
married, had a difficult relationship and the question of visitation was pending before the Probate Court. A state
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Some may claim that female offenders are bad mothers who did not care
224
about their children when they committed their crimes . I have argued elsewhere
that it is unfair to make such a categorical denunciation without evaluating the
individual relationship between a moth r and her child.225 Indeed, in what is now
widely referred to as the "Girlfriend Problem," women who live with drug
traffickers find it virtually impossible to avoid criminal activity, resulting in a
choice between leaving their intimates who are often the father of their children
or staying to face potential conspiracy charges. 226 The most relevant voices on
this issue belong to the children of incarcerated parents who are now joining
together to create their own agenda. Their Bill of Rights includes "the right to be
considered when decisions are made about my parents. 227 In other words, when
the voices of innocent victims are heard in sentence allocution, the children of
offenders should routinely be included. If our sentencing practices were more
oriented toward restorative justice and communitarian values, we would
recognize that incarceration is not necessarily the way in which defendants can
correct the harm they have caused to the community at large, including their
children. Instead, we are stuck in an incarcerative rut and are sorely in need of
more innovative sentencing if offenders are to become productive members of
society, which is often dependent on reassembling their families.
In a post-Booker regime, one would expect more compassion for children
and their mothers. Many of these women can succeed, and keep their families
intact, if given a chance. Even pre-Booker, the case law occasionally reflected
such victories. For example, in United States v. Rodriguez,22s a single mother who
benefited from a departure was released early from probation. The Assistant
United States Attorney confirmed that she had been fully cooperative from the
time of her arrest and that "her involvement in the underlying criminal conduct
had been the result of untoward, beguiling, and strong influences by the co-
defendant on whose behalf Ms. Rodriguez had acted. 229 Criminal activity based
court restraining order and trespass notice had also been issued concerning the defendant's behavior in
attempting to visit his daughter. Therefore, the question of public safety was viewed as justifying a sufficient
nexus for the condition. Id. at 311-12.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, No. SA-04-CR-404(2)-FB, 2005 WL 1683628, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
July 8, 2005) (noting that the defendant did not appear concerned about her children being in proximity to drugs
in denying a request for probation based on fact that defendant would be in prison at the same time as her
husband).
225. Remember the Family, supra note 1; see infra the "Girlfriend Problem" at text accompanying notes
230-63.
226. See Douglas A Berman, Legislative Briefing on "The Girlfriend Problem," http://sentencing.
typepad.com/sentencinglawand_policy/2005/06/legislative-bri.html (last visited July 15th, 2006) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review); Severing Family Ties, supra note 1; see also United States v. Greer, 375 F.
Supp. 2d 790, 795 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
227. CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS: A BILL OF RIGHTS, RIGHT 3 (2003), available at
http://www.centerforce.org/families/bill-of-rights.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
228. United States v. Rodriguez, No. CRIM.A. 01-639-2, 2005 WL 994606, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28,
2005).
229. Id. at * 1.
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on bad choices in relationships should not lead to lengthy prison sentences for
nonviolent women in a post-Booker world. Even without any change to section
5H1.6, the sentencing presumption should be that a reasonable sentence includes
consideration of the offender's role as a sole or primary parent based on the
importance of family considerations to our society. It is unreasonable to
encourage the disintegration of family ties solely on a "just desserts" rationale.
The money that is being spent to incarcerate mothers and provide foster care to
their children can be better used to keep families together while being supervised
and provided with necessary services in the community.
VII. THE "GIRLFRIEND PROBLEM"
When I first began writing about this issue more than ten years ago,23° the
"Girlfriend Problem" had no name. At the time, it struck me when reading the
facts of published drug conspiracy cases that one of the most troubling gender
issues concerning female offenders could not easily be pigeonholed into a
specific type of legal challenge. The subject simply surfaced as background
information that indicated women were often being charged as a result of their
relationships with men.23' Little has changed in the past decade. United States v.
Hued,23 2 decided in 2004 is typical: "Hued's legal troubles arise from her on-and-
off six year romantic relationship with her co-defendant ... a drug dealer" who
stored some of his belongings in her apartment.33 Similarly, in United States v.
Greer,234 Judge Adelman noted that the defendant "did not sell cocaine but was
the girlfriend, sister, and cousin of men who did. On several occasions, she
helped them in relatively small ways. Thus, although the offense was serious, her
involvement was "minimal., 235 Greer was characterized as making "poor choices
in men, ''216 another common feature that often has it roots before the advent of the
current criminal charges. Generally, these females either are married to, living
with, or intimately involved with males who are described as being central to the
conspiracies in question. In some cases, such as in Greer, male relatives may be
230. Gender and Sentencing, supra note 1, at 977-99.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1443 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendant made
several trips with her boyfriend who was reputed to be a major drug dealer); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d
969, 972 (5th Cir. 1990) (despite male co-conspirator's agreement to plead guilty only if his female co-
conspirator's name was omitted from each count, such omission did not amount to her de facto dismissal from
the indictment), See generally Shimica Gaskins, Note, "Women of Circumstance" - The Effects of Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 AM. CRM. L. REV. 1533 (2004);
Haneefah A. Jackson, Note, When Love Is a Crime: Why the Drug Prosecutions and Punishments of Female
Non-Conspirators Cannot Be Justified by Retributive Principles, 46 How. L.J. 517 (2003).
232. 338 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
233. Id. at 454-55.
234. 375 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
235. Id. at 793.
236. Id.
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the link,237 as well as intimates. In contrast to their paramours, the female
defendants often have relatively minor roles in the conspiracies that include
facilitating drug deals by answering the phone, opening the door, or acting as
couriers for their male intimates.
While the mate of a white collar criminal may be shielded from his crime in
the suites, the living companion of a drug dealer who sells his wares on the
streets or at home is not equally sheltered. Mere presence is easily converted to
membership in a conspiracy by the number of ways in which women have been
socialized to further their relationships with men. Thus, indigent women become
active participants in crime by permitting drugs in the home, answering the door
or the phone, and by giving or bringing contraband to buyers.
Given the nature of such women's relationships, unless a female leaves her
mate who is dealing drugs, it may be relatively difficult for her to disassociate
herself from the conspiracy. In other words, she is likely to be aware of his
criminal endeavors and her familial actions often promote his criminal activities.
Undoubtedly, such females do receive the benefit of drug money and have
enough involvement with illicit activity to be charged and often convicted of
crime. However, many of them have children with their male co-conspirators and
may genuinely love them, while others are conditioned by culture or coercion to
stay. The mates of drug dealers, unlike the mates of men accused of white collar
crime who also receive the benefits of tainted money, usually live at the scene of
criminal activity. Therefore, some women who are poor may be sucked into
criminal drug activity whereas women who associate with more affluent men
who commit white collar felonies do not face putting their relationships aside in
order to remain crime free. For example, in United States v. Rodriguez3. the
uneducated addicted mother of five lived in a home populated by drug dealers,
including her husband, knew the drugs were being sold in her home and
benefited from the money to support her family. Even with a departure, she faced
a statutory minimum of five years and the parental termination of at least some of
her children.239 The court noted that "had [the defendant] been charged in state
court with a similar offense, she would most likely not be faced with the specter
of losing custody of her children by reason of a lengthy incarceration.
' 2
40
237. See, e.g., United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 2006) (involving a father of
grown daughters); United Sates v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1206 (D. N.M. 2005) (involving an uncle who
was a father figure); United States v. Mata, 145 F. App'x 276, 278 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Hernandez, 2005 WL 1330764, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2005) (involving a brother, and two co-defendants who
fathered her children); United States v. Musick, 2005 WL 1278429, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 2, 2005) ("[The]
Court does not believe in the absence of [her son] that the defendant would have ever been involved in any
criminal activity.").
238. No. 8:03CR36, 2005 WL 1319259 (D. Neb. June 3, 2005).
239. Id. at *4.
240. Id. at *5.
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The interaction between class and gender can also be observed in an early
Guidelines case, United States v. Pozzy,24' where the wife appeared to have little
to do with her husband's drug business beyond enjoying its financial benefits.
The trial judge found that the wife had no alternative but to stay or leave when
her husband deals drugs and then she becomes an abettor. He granted a departure
citing section 5K2.12, which permits coercion to justify a lesser sentence. The
First Circuit reversed the departure on the grounds that coercion does not exist
merely because of the marital relationship,22 while recognizing that a departure
might still be available on the grounds the wife was a minor participant.2"
The interrelationship of gender to crime and sentencing is fairly complex in
such situations and raises a number of policy questions. When charging
conspiracies, how do prosecutors determine which women to arrest? Are some
women really arrested to provide leverage for plea bargaining with the more
culpable male, either to provide information and testimony in exchange for
immunity or to be dismissed in exchange for the male's plea?244 What determines
who is charged with conspiracy rather than misprision of felony, or who is
allowed to plead to possession, or escape charges entirely in exchange for
cooperation? Since decisions concerning the nature of the charge and plea
bargaining rest with the prosecutor unless some constitutionally improper
motivation is shown, gender questions concerning their culpability are often not
raised on appeal by women who are convicted because evidence supporting the
verdict always exists. For example, one female defendant who moved to
Minneapolis to marry her male co-defendant claimed she had no criminal intent
to join the conspiracy, but found herself counting money and writing messages
for him.245 Large quantities of drugs and money were found in their residence and
she admitted to maintaining ledgers.246 Needless to say, the jury convicted her.
Similarly, another woman who pled guilty to a drug conspiracy agreed to
accompany her boyfriend of five years on a drug buy and carry the purchase
money. 247 While she claimed it was the first time she had actively participated in
his drug dealing, she admitted that for two years she suspected his illegal
earnings were drug related.248
241. 902 F.2d 133 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990).
242. Id. at 139.
243. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.2 (2005).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1992) (white collar crime family
business case, in which the wife claimed she was coerced into pleading guilty by the government's threat not
allow her husband to enter a plea if she did not agree to the bargain; the court noted that the government could
appropriately bargain for a package deal as part of the plea, provided that the defendant's decision to forego a
trial is otherwise voluntary, but did not assess the implied coercion of a package deal in a husband-wife
context).
245. United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 590 (8th Cir. 1992).
246. Id.
247. United States v. Handy, 752 F. Supp. 561, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
248. Id.
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It is obvious that many of these women are not totally innocent, although
some claim mere presence as a defense at trial. 9 However, unless the
government permits them to plead to lesser offenses they become subject to long
mandatory minimums and Guidelines sentences that are disproportionate to their
culpability as a member of the conspiracy. While the safety valve was enacted to
rectify some of these problems, it is not a panacea, because it applies only to
certain charges and categories of offenders and also has a tell-all requirement.2 50
Anecdotally, women do not appear to be comfortable "betraying" their intimates
by revealing the details of their crimes, even though this may mean they give upS25
the opportunity to avoid prosecution21 or to obtain the significant benefit that the
safety valve offers to depart below any applicable mandatory minimum.
Similarly, continuing relationships with male co-conspirators can result in the
252government refusing to move for a substantial assistance departure.
Determining the extent of a female's criminal culpability also comes directly
into play in assigning minimal or minor role status for purposes of downwardS •253
departures in drug conspiracies pursuant to section 3B 1.2 of the Guidelines.254 It
is hardly accidental that the Bureau of Justice Statistics once defined persons
having a "peripheral" role in the offense to include a "girlfriend, spouse, or
courier with little knowledge of the drug activity. 255 In some cases, police
investigative methods can result in much longer sentences than would otherwise
be available. For example, in United States v. Floyd,256 in order to identify a
249. See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 536 (1993) (rejecting the proposition that severance
is required as a matter of law when co-defendants present mutually exclusive defenses; Zafiro presented
unsuccessful defense that she was merely the girlfriend of one of the defendants and had no idea that the
suitcase he stored in her apartment contained drugs); see also United States v. Andrews, 137 F. App'x 993, 994
(9th Cir. 2005) (finding notes containing information about victims, spending spree notes and testimony about
purchases were sufficient for a conviction as a participant in co-defendant's credit card offenses and also that
the exclusion of expert evidence about battered woman syndrome was not an abuse of discretion).
250. See generally Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1471 (2000). See also infra text accompanying notes 286-301.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Hued, 338 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding a woman
violated the agreement not to prosecute by omitting details of her boyfriend's crimes and contacting him).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Noe, 411 F.3d 878, 890-91 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the government
refused to depart based on intercepted phone calls); United States v. Fleuristal, 133 F. App'x 781, 783 (2d Cir.
2005) (noting that the government refused to depart based on defendant's lies with intent to minimize her co-
defendant's role and protect an unapprehended co-conspirator).
253. Not all conspiracies with female participants concern drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Tebrugge,
134 F. App'x 291, 297 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (involving a defendant who knowingly concealed stolen firearms, a
wife who claimed she acted under influence of her husband, and where the court denied adjustment although it
indicated she was less involved in offense than her husband); United States v. Wilson, 955 F.2d 547, 551 (8th
Cir. 1992) (involving a conspiracy concerning stolen property, a female defendant who was involved with male
co-conspirators and who refused a minor participant role because she stored stolen property at her house for
main co-conspirator and where the government opposed the departure because of her long-term relationship
with the main male co-conspirator).
254. See infra text accompanying notes 310-23.
255. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1991, 542,
tbl.5.43.
256. See 738 F.Supp. 1256, 1261 (D. Minn. 1990) (approving a downward departure for family ties).
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woman's supplier, the officials kept making transactions with her that then added
to the cumulative weight of drugs for which she was sentenced. The decision in
United States v. ReecS 7 did not even discuss the appropriateness of using seven
controlled buys or the inclusion of nearly ten times the amount of drugs sold to
the informant in previous years, which significantly increased the potential
sentence.
A final issue in conspiracy cases relates to granting upward departures to
women. Given the cultural and social factors that face women who become
involved in drug cases, courts should be cautious in upholding upward departures
in cases where the wife was originally charged with conspiracy and pleads guilty
to a lesser drug crime. Thus, cases such as United States v. Crawford"8 should be
read with care. Crawford affirmed the trial court's inclusion of the total amount
of drugs relevant to the conspiracy as justifying a wife's upward departure for
simple possession. Similarly, conspiracies to manufacture methamphetamine
may result in upward departures for putting children at risk,59 which has become
a substantial problem because meth labs often are mom and pop operations.
However, gender roles should not blindly be followed when they are contradicted
by facts demonstrating that the particular female offender's criminality was not
affected by gender considerations. Thus, in a particular case the wife's extensive
role in a conspiracy may justify an upward adjustment.2'6 In order words, while
most of the women offenders discussed in this article are characterized by their
gender roles, not all female criminals are so defined.26'
Ultimately, it is difficult to draw a principled line as to how women should
be sentenced in drug conspiracies where their role is really one of facilitation
based on their socialization. Such women do not exhibit duress in the classic
sense, but in many cases there is little doubt that their involvement in crime
revolves around their efforts to accommodate their male intimates. Should these
women be the beneficiaries of modem day paternalism, or does factoring their
socialization and/or victimization into the departure mix merely acknowledge the
reality of many female offenders' lives? "Domination, disadvantage and
disempowerment" are the real issues generally facing such women.262 Translating
this to a sentencing context, it becomes evident that any attempt to gender-
257. 146 F. App'x 947 (10th Cir. 2005).
258. 883 F.2d 963, 966 (11 th Cir. 1989).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 375 F. Supp. 2d 832, 833 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (imposing a six-level
increase since manufacture near children of a co-conspirator).
260. See, e.g., United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 101 (1st Cir. 1991) (involving a wife who was a
former prostitute, had an active role in her husband's conspiracy to violate the Mann Act by interviewing new
prostitutes, called to complete credit card transactions, and discussed problems with hired prostitutes, who
received a four level enhancement).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Blaylock, 413 F.3d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding no error in
upward adjustment as organizer of criminal activity where female was "mastermind" of robbery).
262. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1394 (1986).
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neutralize the Guidelines is destined to foster inequity if we do not recognize the
shared background and experiences of many women who face criminal penalties.
In a post-Booker world, defense counsel should raise these issues during plea
negotiations as well as in sentencing. Educating prosecutors and judges about the
realities of these women's' lives is key to obtaining just dispositions. Even if
prosecutors do not react favorably, the flexibility given to judges makes this type
of sensitivity training critical. The National Association of Women Judges in
conjunction with the National Institute of Corrections has published a curriculum
on sentencing women to address such issues, which are the same for state and
263federal sentencing.
VIII. ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES DEPARTURES WITH GENDERED OVERTONES
A. Section 5H1.3: Mental and Emotional Condition and Section 5K2.13:
Diminished Capacity
Several circuits have recognized that psychological abuse falls within section
5H1.3 .264 All section 5H1.3 departures require exceptional circumstances. Thus,
even child abuse must be measured against the typical defendant, many of whom
265have suffered such abuse, as opposed to the general population. However, the
Second Circuit rejected the view that the abuse must be shocking, rising to the
level of severe beatings, rape, sodomy, and prostitution, when it held sexual and
physical abuse that lasted from birth till adolescence was extraordinary.26 6
Typically, most departures involve profound histories of sexual victimization and
personality disorders, and the history of abuse must contribute to the commission
267
of the offense, which may be even more difficult to prove. In contrast, United
268States v. Rodriguez granted a departure for a woman who was raped while
awaiting sentencing pursuant to sections 5H1.3 and 5K2.0. 269 The rape caused the
woman to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression.
A sentence below the applicable Guideline range may also be warranted
under section 5K2.13 "if the defendant committed the offense while suffering
from a significantly reduced mental capacity" that contributed substantially to the
commission of the offense. Post traumatic stress disorder can be the basis of such
263. See SENTENCING WOMEN OFFENDERS, supra note 170.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Roe, 976 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Vela, 927
F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875 (1991); United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182,
185 (8th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Shore, 143 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80-81 (D. Mass. 2001).
265. United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 326, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2005).
266. Id. at 334.
267. See id. at 335 (finding that while the abused defendant might have been extremely vulnerable or
fearful, there was not enough evidence to show that her impaired condition led to her engaging in bank fraud
conspiracy and remanding for factual support of departure or imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence).
268. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
269. Id. at 1240-41.
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a departure,27° as well as a reason to withdraw a plea.27' However, as a result of
the recent amendment to the Diminished Capacity section increasing the
causation requirement, it is difficult to obtain such a departure based simply onmenta " • 272
mental incapacity. The amendment also limits the extent of departure to the
contribution of the reduced mental capacity to the offense. This departure is
limited to nonviolent offenses, prohibits consideration of voluntary drug usage,
and is discouraged for defendants with significant criminal history. Ironically,
these restrictions make females the most likely recipients of this departure.
B. Section 5K2.12: Coercion or Duress
Section 5K2.12 of the federal Guidelines provides that serious coercion or
duress not amounting to a complete defense may be a reason for the court to
grant a downward departure. Since extraordinary circumstances are not required,
the departure may be applicable in many cases where a woman is subject to
battering, yet appears not to be extensively cited. Judge Gertner has noted that
"[i]n my experience few lawyers even bother to examine the relationship
between the woman offender and her male codefendants, much less litigate it. 273
In practice, departures for coercion are more significant for females than for
males and appear to be used more frequently by white than minority women.
The built-in limitation to this departure is that "ordinarily" such coercion will
be sufficiently serious to warrant departure only when it involves a threat of
physical injury. The 2004 version provides that the extent of a departure based on
coercion and duress ordinarily should depend on several considerations,
including the proportionality of the defendant's actions to the seriousness of the
coercion, blackmail, or duress involved. The seminal case in this area is United
States v. Johnson,274 which considered battered women's syndrome as an
affirmative defense of duress for acts of distribution that are included as relevant
conduct under section lB 1.3 and as evidence of incomplete duress for which the
court could grant a discretionary downward departure.275 More recently, United
States v. Davis276 departed where the defendant was beaten so severely that she
270. United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 631-32 (9th Cir. 2006).
271. Cf Brown v. United States, N. 05-00075-04-CV-W-GAF, 2005 WL 1907521, at *13-14 (W.D. Mo.
2005) (finding defendant had not met her burden for determining competency).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Kottke, 138 F. App'x 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2005) (refusing to depart for
pathological gambling addiction because it did not substantially contribute to her forgeries); United States v.
Lyles, No. CR. 04-0333(PLF), 2005 WL 975609, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2005) (despite finding that defendant
suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder, the court concluded that the disorder had no significant connection
to her offense and also declined to impose a non-Guidelines sentence).
273. Gertner, supra note 15 at 304. See generally Sarah M. Buel, Violence Against Women: Effective
Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217
(2003).
274. 956 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1992).
275. Id. at 898-902.
276. No. 03 CR 84, 2004 WL 1965698 (N.D. I11. 2004).
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miscarried twice, and her decision to stay and sell drugs was significantly related
to her dependent personality disorder. Generalized fear is insufficient to
support this departure,2 7s and it is questionable whether a one-time threat without
evidence of actual physical violence in the relationship satisfies its requirement.279
Parental influence is also analyzed under this departure, but the Tenth Circuit has
rejected it to the extent it reflects only economic need.2s°
Sometimes, a woman's reaction may have a cultural dimension, in that she
may have been socialized to regard domestic violence as a given and to obey the
commands of her male intimate. While feminists are rightly concerned that this
"Svengali" effect may sound sexist, it would be a disservice not to raise the issue
where it represents the female defendant's life history. United States v. Gaviria2s'
applied section 5K2.12 to a woman whose history established a pattern of
dependence due to male control from a combination of physical and
psychological abuse, cultural norms, economic dependence, and other factors.
In contrast, a few courts view cultural heritage as "the joinder of gender and
national origin, two expressly forbidden considerations in sentencing. ' '282 This
misses the point that the departure is not granted on the grounds that one belongs
to a particular group, but that one's life experiences have been shaped by one's
background and the person's individual history may demonstrate factors that
justify a departure in a particular case. In other words, not all people from a
particular background will have the same experiences, nor will those experiences
be limited to people of the same cultural heritage or gender. By analogy, a male
who is a single or primary parent should be able to get the same consideration for
his children in sentencing as a similarly situated female. It is just much more
likely that individuals with sole or primary caretaking responsibility are female.
Similarly, women in some cultures are more likely to be socialized in a manner
that encourages their facilitation of male requests.
Duress may arise in robberies, if the woman's involvement revolves around
her relationship with a male, often the father of her children, who subjects her to
physical injury and psychological intimidation, including threats of violence
against her or her children. Again, even if not sufficient to obtain an acquittal,
284this factor is generally relevant in sentencing. United States v. Dilorio is a
particularly troubling case that demonstrates how gender factors are ignored in
the departure matrix. The trial judge granted a three level departure for being in
277. Id. at *6; see also United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247 (D. Mass. 2004)
(woman was locked in a room and forced under threats to insert heroin pellets in her rectum).
278. See United States v. Cotto, 347 F.3d 441,446-47 (2d Cir. 2003).
279. United States v. Beal, 352 F. Supp. 2d 14, 20 (D. Me. 2005) (rejecting departure).
280. See United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 1999).
281. 804 F. Supp. 476,479-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
282. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 2001).
283. Dixon v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 2447-48 (2006) (holding defendant must prove duress by a
preponderance at trial).
284. 948 F.2d I (lstCir. 1991).
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between a minimal and minor participant, however he refused to grant a further
departure based on her personal circumstances. The defendant claimed that her
early severe disfigurement left her scarred mentally and physically. When she
became romantically involved with her co-defendant her actions were blinded by
her love for him. She had long reconstructive surgery and was employed for the
last four years. The trial judge remarked that applying Guidelines gave him great
personal anguish. "If I came on this bench as a free agent today, this lady would
not go to jail because I believe her story. '285 However, he denied any departure
since her condition was not extraordinary. Similarly, she was not a minimal
participant because she was aware of her co-defendant's continuing activities and
counted money for him.
While the defendant appealed claiming that the trial judge believed he could
not depart, the First Circuit considered that the judge had exercised his discretion
and simply concluded her case was not extraordinary, thereby precluding any
appeal. In other words, breast beating by the trial judge about the effects of the
Guidelines was considered an exercise of discretion, not a clear statement that the
judge had no discretion to depart. It is unfortunate that the defendant did not rely
on imperfect coercion rather than extraordinary circumstances to justify any
additional departure. Cases such as these fit more easily into section 5K2.12.
Undoubtedly, when defending women who are bound to one of their male co-
conspirators, lawyers must consider how to weave the varying departures
rationales into a theme that supports the greatest permissible departure, but this
intersection of factors is a prime candidate for a non-Guidelines sentence.
C. Section 5C1.2: The Safety Valve and Section 5K1.1: Substantial
Assistance Departures
Congress enacted the safety valve, which is reflected in section 5C1.2,
because of the generally acknowledged unfairness of punishing first-time, low-
level drug offenders more severely than high-level co-conspirators who had
information they could trade in exchange for substantial assistance departures.
Because the safety valve appears in § 3553(f) in mandatory language, it appears
that Booker has not abrogated this provision, since it made no reference to
excising it. Thus, while the Guidelines are discretionary, the safety valve is still
mandatory.8 6 Since the statute specifically contains the same criteria as appear in
the Guidelines, it is unlikely that the provisions will be interpreted to give judges
the ability to depart below a mandatory minimum if the provisions of the statute
are not met. In other words, the restrictions, such as one-point criminal history
and truthful disclosure to the government, are still in effect. Thus, in United
285. Id. at 8.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Suarez, No. 03 CR. 747(JFK), 2005 WL 287400, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 7, 2005) (holding that Booker does not affect application of the safety valve).
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States v. Ochoa-Suarez,"' the judge found the female defendant ineligible for the
safety valve because she was a manager for safety valve purposes and failed to
make a full and truthful disclosure. However, once the safety valve is met, the
Guidelines range is only advisory. Therefore, a female defendant who pled guilty
to conspiracy to distribute cocaine was entitled not only to a sentence below the
mandatory minimum, but also below the thirty- to thirty-seven-month advisory
range where she admitted to knowingly driving a male acquaintance to a drug
deal and the judge noted that similar defendants were typically charged with
misprision of a felony, carrying a much less severe penalty.28
While the safety valve adjustment provided in section 5C1.2 was given to
twenty-five percent of drug offenders in 1999,289 it does not trump a statutory
prohibition on probation.2 ° Similarly, counsel must always ascertain that the plea
is to a drug offense to which the safety valve applies. For example, in United
States v. Anton,29' the safety valve was unavailable, although the defendant met
its eligibility criteria, where the listed chemical guideline under which she was
sentenced did not provide for the reduction. Eligibility also depends on the
defendant not being a supervisor or having any other significant role in the
offense. While the criminal history cannot exceed one point, many more women
than men have no prior criminal history. However, the fact that no weapon can be
possessed may pose difficulties for women who are living with a male who has a
significant role in the drug offense and may keep a weapon in the house.
As in Ochoa-Suarez, the most problematic qualification for the application of
the safety valve to females is the truthful proffer to the government before the
sentencing hearing of all information and evidence the defendant has concerning
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
common scheme or plan. It is well accepted that many women will not disclose
negative information about the father of their children or other male intimates,
even though that will preclude application of the departure. Claiming fear of
one's male co-defendants to avoid full disclosure is also not a sufficient response.
The en banc Eighth Circuit has held that the trial court's safety valve findings
regarding the truthfulness of the proffer can be overturned only if they are clearly
erroneous even in cases where the credibility decision is based on the
government's proffer, rather than testimony .292
Substantial assistance departures provide the only other possibility to depart
below a mandatory minimum sentence. If the government refuses to proffer the
motion, and the defendant is otherwise ineligible for the safety valve, the
287. Id.
288. United States v. Cherry, 366 F. Supp. 2d 372, 373-78 (E.D. Va. 2005).
289. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2000).
290. See United States v. Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2004).
291. 380 F.3d 333, 335-36 (8th Cir. 2004).
292. United States v. Alvarado-Rivera, 412 F.3d 942, 947-49 (8th Cir. 2005). The resulting ten-year
mandatory sentence for wife was sixty percent higher than the Guidelines sentence. Id.
2006 / Gender-Related Issues
mandatory minimum will be imposed, even if the Guidelines sentence is
substantially less, unless there is a showing of unconstitutional motive.293
However, once the government moves for substantial assistance, the court is not
bound by the extent of the departure requested by the government. For example,
in United States v. Christenson,294 a downward departure of 75% for substantial
assistance was recently affirmed by an equally divided vote of the Eighth Circuit
sitting en banc. The government had recommended only a 10% departure to 216
months, while the trial judge believed sixty months was appropriate given the
statutory sentencing factors. The panel decision in Christenson distinguished
other cases reversing departures significantly below the government's
recommendation by citing differences in the nature of the cooperation and the
application of the statutory sentencing factors. 295 This battle still appears to be
waged in the Eighth Circuit, with a more recent case reversing a 73% downward
departure on the basis that an "extraordinary reduction must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances. ,2 96 Interestingly, each of the five Eighth Circuit
cases involving extreme departures occurred in drug conspiracies, and the
defendant was female in four of the five cases.297 Christenson was the only Eighth
Circuit case so far that did not result in a reversal, and it has no precedential
value.298 While it appears that extraordinary reductions must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that this decision
is not dependent on the valuation of the assistance by the government, but by the
evidence concerning the assistance.299
A 50% departure from a twenty-year mandatory minimum was recently
granted for substantial assistance instead of the 30% recommended by the
government, when the court found that the Guidelines range was "excessive and
may work to promote not respect, but derision of the law, for the law cannot be
viewed as merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without taking into
account the real conduct and circumstances involved in sentencing."3°° The court
293. See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 399 F.3d 888, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the finding that
defendant was ineligible for safety valve due to criminal history category and imposing sentence of 120 months,
where sentencing range was seventy-eight to ninety-seven months, and there was no showing of
unconstitutional motive by the government in denying substantial assistance departure despite defendant's
testimony that she did everything possible to assist the government); United States v. Valentin, 131 F. App'x
892, 896 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming because an irrational distain based on alleged personal conflict was not an
unconstitutional motivation).
294. 424 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005).
295. United States v. Christenson, 403 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005).
296. United States v. Coyle, 429 F.3d 1192, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 2005).
297. See United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1165 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding a 68% reduction
unreasonable); United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding a 75% reduction
unreasonable).
298. Saenz, 428 F.3d at 1162 n.1; cf United States v. Burns, 438 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding a
60% departure in a case where the government recommended a 15% departure), rehearing en banc granted,
opinion vacated, May 18, 2006.
299. Id. at 1162, 1164-65.
300. United States v. Ray, 375 F. Supp. 2d 832, 834-35 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
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characterized the defendant's history as "a disheartening litany of choices
predicated on abuse, severe drug addiction and hopelessness," including being
raped, subjected to domestic abuse, losing custody of her children, and suffering
from dysthymia, a mental disorder.3""
D. Section 5K2.20: Aberrant Behavior
A departure based on aberrant behavior, section 5K2.20, is permitted only if
the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal
transaction that (1) was without significant planning; (2) was of limited duration;
and (3) represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-
abiding life. The requirement of a single incident limits the applicability of this
departure,3'0 but circumstances may warrant it in individual cases. For example,
pre-Booker the Ninth Circuit found that time to plan a retaliatory act does not
prove that a crime is the product of significant planning, and that ten minutes of
ranting and raving does not fall outside the requirement that the crime be ofS • 303
limited duration. District courts have favored this departure. In United States v.
Patterson3 O a female was given a thirteen-level downward departure for aberrant
behavior where she had refused the offer by her friend, a narcotics trafficker, to
accept money to help import drugs, but communicated the offer to a second
friend and introduced them without otherwise participating in the conspiracy or
receiving payment for the introduction.05 Similarly, in United States v. Booe,3°6 a
severely depressed single pregnant mother in financial distress who robbed a
bank with a threatening note was given a nine-level departure to result in a
twelve month sentence, with half being served in home detention.3° Even a crime
of omission, failing to stop illegal conduct has been found to be a single course of
conduct justifying the departure.3°m Given the number of aberrant behavior
departures before the United States Sentencing Commission required a single
incident, it is likely that some judges will return to their previous practice and
now use their discretion to apply this departure more broadly in evaluating the
reasonableness of a non-Guidelines sentence.
301. Id. at 834.
302. United Sates v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1212-13 (D. N.M. 2005); see also United States v.
Campbell, No. 04 CR. 452(RMB), 2005 WL 2001882, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2005) (declining to apply
departure where female purchased guns on three occasions over seventeen days at three different locations).
303. United States v. Smith, 387 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing factual determinations
regarding departure and vacating for resentencing where unclear the trial court believed it had authority to
depart).
304. 281 F. Supp. 2d 626 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
305. Id. at 628.
306. 252 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Tenn. 2003)
307. Id. at 587-89.
308. United States v. Hued, 338 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
309. See, e.g., United States v. Leyva-Franco, 162 F. App'x 752 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming departure).
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E. Section 3B1.2(b): Mitigating Role Adjustment and Section 3E1.1:
Acceptance of Responsibility
Because many women facilitate the criminal activity of their male intimates,
they are likely candidates for receiving departures of two to four points for
playing a minor or mitigating role in the offense under section 3B1.2(b).
However, a trial judge did not clearly err in denying a mitigating role reduction
in light of a wife's extensive knowledge of her husband's drug activities and her
playing a necessary role in production of drugs at their residence.1 ° Indeed, the
same case upheld an enhancement for both parents for exposing their children to
the risk of harm by their manufacture of methamphetamine."' Similarly, a
defendant is not automatically entitled to a minor or minimal role adjustment
even if she is somewhat less culpable than other participants.3 2 A separate
departure of four points may be awarded in lieu of a mitigating role adjustment
for a defendant who had no participation other than allowing use of the
premises."'
The commentary to section 3B 1.2 implies that minimal participant departures
should be used infrequently and in situations indicating a lack of knowledge or
understanding of the scope and structure of the conspiracy.3 4 This may be
difficult to demonstrate for a woman living with a key co-conspirator. For
example, United States v. Madera-Gallegos3" held that a wife who retrieved a
heroin sample for husband was properly denied a four-level minimal role
departure, even though the government had recommended that reduction by
stipulation. The trial judge's two-level departure was upheld based on the
husband's statements that she was his partner, the location of the gram scale in
the cupboard by the Mazola, and the fact that she got the drugs in question and
came back with the sample. United States v. Hall3' 6 is another example of a
woman living with a drug dealer who handled money to obtain items for which
identification was needed. While she requested a three-level reduction falling
between a minor and minimal participant, her two-level reduction was found not
to be clear error. A minor rather than minimal participant departure was also
310. United States v. Bivens, 129 F. App'x 159, 167 (6th Cir. 2005).
311. Id. at 164-65 (rejecting claims that enhancement was based on evidence from other cases and
penalizing them for being parents).
312. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2006) (involving a daughter making trips to pick
up drugs and act as facilitator, neither minor nor minimal); United States v. Barber, 132 F. App'x 891, 896 (2d
Cir. 2005) (reversing three-level reduction in her offense, even though her participation may have been less
extensive than that of her husband and son); United States v. Tebrugge, 134 F. App'x 291, 297 (11 th Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of adjustment although court stated wife was less involved in offense than her husband).
313. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.8(a)(2); Hued, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Manasrah, 347 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (involving a case
where the parties agreed the defendant was entitled to a four-point mitigating role reduction where she only cut
coupons at home that others fraudulently redeemed, knew little about the scheme, and profited minimally).
315. 945 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Cir. 1991).
316. 949 F.2d 247, 248-49 (8th Cir. 1991).
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affirmed in United States v. Tabares,3 7 where the couple was selling cocaine
from their home. She leased the apartment and both made rent payments. Since
the drugs were in plain view and cash was readily accessible, she was not
considered a minimal participant. '1 8 One poignant note about the case is that the
woman kept telling the police to get out of her baby's room.39
Sometimes, lawyers do not even think to request such departures. In United
States v. Headley,32° where a wife's role in the conspiracy was limited to
delivering drugs on several occasions, the court remanded the case based on
incompetence of counsel because no argument as to her minor role status had
been raised before the trial judge. On the other hand, in United States v. Sailes,3 '
the wife's sentence was almost as harsh as that of her husband's, whose role in
the drug activity was much greater. Judges also vary in assessing the significance
of the role that mules and drug couriers play in conspiracies. As a result, drug
couriers will not necessarily be presumed to play a minor role.322 For example, in
United States v. Cacho,323 the fact that a mother of four small children was a mule
did not entitle her to a departure as a minimal or minor participant in the
conspiracy.
Acceptance of responsibility under section 3El. 1 is also a possibility for
women who plead guilty. Because women often have a relatively low offense
level, they are prohibited from receiving an additional departure point. However,
in Eisinger a three-point departure was granted under this rule for atypical
rehabilitation efforts by the pregnant defendant who was attempting to turn
around her life before giving birth. This adjustment poses a problem for women
suffering mental illness who contest whether they had the requisite mens rea to
commit the offense, which some circuits view as a factual, rather than legal
challenge.324 Similarly, continued criminal conduct after the entry of a plea is a
sufficient basis to refuse to award the adjustment.3"5
317. 951 F.2d 405 (lst Cir. 1991).
318. Id. at 410.
319. Id. at 409.
320. 923 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991).
321. 872 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1989).
322. Compare United States v. Barona, 150 F. App'x 944, 949 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of
minor role adjustment for female drug courier), with United States v. Teyer, 322 F. Supp. 2d 359, 379-80
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing method of analysis and applying minor role adjustment for male pistolero in
massive multinational narcotics conspiracy).
323. 951 F.2d 308, 309 (11 th Cir. 1992).
324. See, e.g., United States v. Gorsuch, 404 F.3d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing conflicting case
law).
325. See, e.g., United States v. Kottke, 138 F. App'x 864 , 866 (8th Cir. 2005) (admitted she cashed
forged checks after plea, but claimed it was due to gambling addiction).
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F. Creative Departures: Pre- and Post-Booker
Creativity was substantially limited by the revision to section 5K2.0, which
narrowly construes the appropriateness of departures. However, there is always
some possibility to improvise. For example, in United States v. K,3 2 sentencing of
a twenty-one-year-old, nonviolent, first-time drug offender was deferred for one
year pending his completion of the Special Options Rehabilitation Service
327(SORS) program. This avoided the prohibition against departures based on
postsentencing rehabilitative efforts. In the post-Booker world, creativity has
been restored, assuming that counsel proactively investigates the defendant's
background to fashion arguments favoring leniency. Similarly, after computing
the Guidelines sentence, some judges are simply listing the § 3553(a) factors that
favor a lower non-Guidelines sentence.325
On occasion, a court will be so moved by the harsh results mandated by the
Guidelines, that it will find a way to avoid what appears to be a preordained
sentence. For example, in United States v. Gorsuch,329 a woman suffering from
schizophrenia was convicted of armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm33 °
by a jury that rejected her insanity defense. The court refused to find plain error
in her sentencing, noting:
Ordinarily, we would recognize such an error-but this is a highly unusual
case. The record suggests that Gorsuch is afflicted by a grave mental
illness, except for which she probably never would have committed the
crimes of which she stands convicted. The record also indicates that
Gorsuch had no premeditated intention of harming anyone on the day in
question, and that she is likely to be a law-abiding citizen if she takes
medication to control her illness. One cannot help but cringe at the
seven-year consecutive prison sentence recommended in the PSI Report
with respect to count two for this troubled mother of three who otherwise
lacks a criminal history. We therefore conclude that recognizing this
forfeited error is not necessary to ensure the integrity and fairness of
Gorsuch's sentencing proceeding, and so we decline to afford such
recognition to it."'
326. 160 F. Supp. 2d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
327. Id. at 447.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Frye, 370 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497-98 (W.D. Va. 2005) (noting that if the
female had been given the same deal as her male co-defendant who had a substantial criminal history, she
would have faced a sentence of forty-one months rather than seventy months and citing her lack of criminal
record, her ineligibility obtain safety valve relief because of the particular charge, her inability to provide any
useful information for a substantial assistance motion, her youth, and her recent success in drug treatment, in
support of a forty-month sentence).
329. 404 F.3d 543 (lst Cir. 2005).
330. The gun was unloaded. Id. at 544.
331. Id. at 547 (internal footnote omitted).
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Since the sentence was vacated on another count, the decision noted that the
district court could justify a sentence below the Guideline level based upon a
"broader appraisal" under Booker.332 United States v. Hernandez3 reversed a
downward departure that was granted to avoid the defendant's deportation and
separation from her husband and two children who were American citizens.334
Hopefully, in a post-Booker world a non-Guidelines sentence would be affirmed.
Post-arrest rehabilitation has justified downward departures, but requires
exceptional circumstances."' Even after Booker, it appears that a detailed
rationale is necessary to justify the extent of the reduction.136 A non-Guidelines
sentence was recently awarded to correct unwarranted disparity between co-
defendants. 33' The Court noted that in drug conspiracies, the plea bargaining race
goes to the swift and viewed the disparity in plea offers as caused by the
defendant's delay "either through her own ignorance or inadequate advice.
' 3 8
Indeed, with many first time female offenders, their lack of sophistication about
how the criminal justice system works is their worst enemy, though pre-Booker,
disparity was a prohibited factor absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct.
However, as previously mentioned, the mere fact that non-Guidelines sentences
are available does not mean that all judges are sympathetic to granting them.339
IX. GENDERED CORRECTIONAL ISSUES THAT ARE LEGITIMATE
SENTENCING FACTORS
Current sentencing practice envisions little if any role for judges in
monitoring the conditions and services that exist in the institutions to which they
sentence women,. unless constitutional deprivations are brought to their
attention.34' However, while judges are prohibited from second-guessing
decisions made by prison administrators, this is not a license to ignore the
potentially tragic consequences of their sentences. The impact on female inmates
of pregnancy, childbirth, loss of privacy, staff sexual misconduct, and lack of
332. Id. at 548.
333. 325 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 2003).
334. Id. at 816.
335. See United States v. Hairston, 127 F. App'x 811,814 (6th Cir. 2005).
336. Id. at 815.
337. United States v. Hensley, 363 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Va. 2005).
338. Id. at 845.
339. See, e.g., United States v. Kottke, 138 F. App'x 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming where trial
court said it saw no reason to believe the female defendant would voluntarily stop perpetrating fraud and that
low end of Guidelines was not appropriate given the extent and severity of the fraud, despite her claim of a
pathological gambling addiction).
340. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
341. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (reducing substantially the ability
to provide system-wide relief). See, e.g., Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231-40 (10th Cir.
2005) (discussing difficulty of prisoners obtaining relief under a variety of theories).
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access to appropriate programs, services, and healthcare are pervasive themes in
the correctional community that are absent from the sentencing debate.
It is time to recognize that all of these factors are legitimate in rendering a
just sentence and are not simply correctional decisions subject to substantial
deference under Turner v. Safley.14 Indeed, the dearth of such considerations in
the sentencing mix demonstrates a level of insensitivity to offenders that reflects
poorly on the criminal justice system as a whole. As Dostoevsky reputedly
observed, "[t]he degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering its
prisons. More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that actions or
omissions that create "a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate" in the
prison setting can form the basis of Eighth Amendment claims alleging cruel and
unusual punishment.3" While judges have not reached out to include so-called
correctional issues in evaluating sentences, this may be due to the lack of any
concerted effort by the defense bar to affirmatively argue their consideration in
specific cases. Now that Booker restores discretion to judges to fashion just
sentences, the range of relevant offender factors has expanded. As a result, in
appropriate cases where female offenders pose little or no public safety concerns,
counsel can argue the unreasonableness of any prison sentence, or of
incarceration at a facility that is likely to retraumatize an abused female, or does
not provide appropriate programming.
Including so-called correctional factors into sentencing is likely to raise a hue
and cry that such an approach leads to unduly lenient sentences due to the
absence of appropriate facilities and programs for women. However, the
sentencing statute requires women not be sentenced more onerously than
necessary. It is Congress' responsibility to build community correctional
facilities and provide the necessary prison services and programs. Instead, for too
long Congress has ignored funding for intermediate sanctions.345 California is
currently reassessing the placement of its female population and has identified
4500 incarcerated women as eligible for community placement, but does not
currently have that capacity.346 Similarly, when Minnesota recently analyzed the
growth of its female prison population, it discovered that the number of funded
prison alternatives had dropped significantly since 1985 and that additional
halfway house capacity had not been funded since the early 1970s.37 Such willful
342. 482 U.S. at 89.
343. Attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky, quoted in Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (D. Mass.
2004) (noting that due to their marginalized status, judges should read petitions of prisoners generously to
ensure that their human rights are protected).
344. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
345. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent Women
Offenders and Their Children, 44 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 377 (2000) [hereinafter Creating Correctional
Alternatives].
346. See supra note 91.
347. ONE LESS BED, REPORT ON ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION-FEMALE OFFENDERS 21 (2004),
available at http://nicic.org/Library/019722 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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blindness to the needs of the correctional population should not result in
unnecessary incarceration. If judges started imposing probation, rather than
prison sentences for the population in the middle, I have no doubt that either
funds would be found, or more optimistically, that we would begin to reassess
whether thirty years of imprisoning ever-increasing numbers of nonviolent
mothers makes any sense from a policy perspective.
Another reason to consider placement as an affirmative sentencing factor is
that the BOP is currently not required to follow judicial recommendations in
program placement decisions. 48 For example, in United States v. Cotton,349 a
revocation case, counsel argued that the reason why the woman did not remain
drug free was that she did not receive the amount of drug treatment the court had
recommended when she was originally sentenced. Counsel proposed a private
drug treatment program as an alternative to a long sentence, which the judge
rejected in favor of a forty-six month sentence, explaining that at this point, drug
and alcohol treatment could best be provided in prison.35° Other cases blithely
refer to judicial recommendations of BOP placement in residential drug abuse
treatment programs3" as if this assures such placements, particularly in the case
of lengthy sentences, when BOP practice is to schedule such placements close to
release. Moreover, the BOP's adoption of regulations limiting its discretion to
make placements to Community Correctional Centers,352 further hinders judges
from making reasonable sentencing decisions. If particular offenders do not
require imprisonment, the absence of appropriate placements should not result in
their incarceration. We do not hospitalize people who come to the emergency
room with minor ailments. Prisons should be treated as a scarce resource for
dangerous criminals who pose public safety risks and for other offenders whose
crimes demand a substantial penalty to avoid bringing the law into disrespect.
Booker should provide support for correcting our over-reliance on incarceration.
A. Pregnancy and Childbirth
Pregnancy and childbirth also raise issues that implicate sentencing. For
example, in United States v. Greer,35 3 Judge Adelman discussed the fact that
giving birth in prison and losing custody of her newborn could cause severe
damage to both the inmate and the child, citing developmental research that
suggests child development consequences when the mother-child bond is
disrupted between the ages of six months and four years, and the physical
348. Rickenbacker v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 2d 347, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
349. 399 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2005).
350. Id. at 915.
351. See, e.g., United States v. Mata, 145 F. App'x 276, 278 (10th Cir. 2005).
352. See infra text accompanying notes 414-24.
353. 375 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
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privation caused by lack of breast-feeding. In addition, the judge noted that the
defendant's pre-natal care, drug, and mental health treatment were more
effectively dealt with in the community."' Yet each year federal judges sentence
pregnant federal offenders, some who will require substantial medical services
during their pregnancies, without any requirement that they should consider such
matters. Indeed, some judges might hesitate to consider such information as
being paternalistic or sexist. Maternal care in prison is typically costly, and
complaints about inadequate health care are not uncommon in federal as well as
state prisons. Even when feasible, litigation is a poor substitute for a healthy
mother and child.356 Thus, keeping pregnant defendants in the community until
their children are born can be critical to both the mother and her infant. While
unlike some states, the BOP does not routinely use physical restraints on
pregnant prisoners, or on women in labor, it is unclear whether this practice
could ever be justified in terms of security concerns, particularly since it arguably
may violate international standards.357
Even without regard to Booker, incarceration of nonviolent pregnant inmates
should be the exception, while deferral of incarceration for a reasonable period
after childbirth should be the norm. Birth should also play a part in the
sentencing decision when a woman's conduct is influenced by postpartumd • 358
depression. Moreover, an often-ignored gender issue lurks in the pregnancy
context, the fact that a lengthy sentence may virtually destroy any possibility that
some females can become a mother at all.359 In other words, women are more
time constrained by men in their ability to parent.3 ° In cases where public safety
is not a significant concern, lengthy sentences for nonviolent women without
children have a dramatically different impact than the same sentences imposed
on nonviolent men.
Instead of defensively responding to attacks that women who want to become
pregnant or who are pregnant are pleading their bellies in a stereotypical attempt
to obtain sympathy, women's advocates should boldly attempt to fashion
354. Id. at 794, n.4 (citing Developments in Law: Alternatives to Incarceration, 11 HARV. L. REV.
1921, 1930-31 (1998)).
355. Id. at 794.
356. See generally Ellen M. Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women's Prisons, 16
CRIM. JUST. 38 (2001).
357. See AMNESTY INT'L, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF
PREGNANT WOMEN (2001).
358. See United States v. Booe, 252 F. Supp. 2d 584, 588 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (granting an aberrant
behavior departure for severely depressed mother of young child, whose counsel characterized her as suffering
from postpartum depression). Cf Cowart v. United States, 139 F. App'x 206, 207 (11th Cir. 2005) (remanding
to conduct a merits view of the claim that postpartum depression affected her plea decision).
359. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that most attributes of marriage
including bearing and raising children do not survive imprisonment), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that
offenders' first child who was taken from her after three days of incarceration was conceived after an eight year
marriage and years of fertility treatments).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
arguments based on fundamental rights to privacy, birth, and family, citing
constitutional and policy underpinnings for such a doctrine, as discussed
previously in the section concerning non-Guidelines sentences based on family
ties.361 In addition, child related concerns should be placed in the broader global
context of international human rights, similar to emerging arguments against
practices leading to sexual misconduct in a prison setting.
362
Conversely, not all pregnant inmates may elect to give birth. Some pregnant
inmates, who would be entitled to obtain an elective abortion if they were free,
may be hindered from doing so because of their incarceration. BOP funds are
used to pay for abortion services only when the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term or in the case of rape. In all other
cases, non-BOP funds must be obtained to pay for any abortion procedure,
although the BOP will pay for escorting the woman to the facility where the
abortion occurs.363 In Roe v. Crawford,364 the Supreme Court recently lifted a stay
of a trial court's injunction requiring a prison diagnostic center to transport a
woman outside the institution for an elective abortion. 36' Again, there should be a
presumption against incarcerating pregnant defendants, unless justified because
of public safety or flight concerns.
B. Family Visits
Losing contact with children during incarceration is a problem for both
mothers and their children.366 Research indicates that parent-child visits are
important not only to maintain relationships, and increase the chance of
successful family reunification, but also to let both individuals deal with their
reactions to separation and loss. 3 67 Visits with children are significant for women
offenders and are often made difficult by the placement of women far from
home.368 In the federal system, the local D.C. women prisoners have been
particularly disadvantaged by their inclusion in the BOP population. Due to the
fewer number of female facilities, it is not uncommon for women to be located
further from home than men. As Judge Posner suggested in Froehlich v.
369Wisconsin Department of Corrections, concerning the transfer of a female state
361. See supra text accompanying notes 212-29.
362. See infra note 383.
363. LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2004, 26-27, available at
www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/legal-guide.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
364. 126 S.Ct. 477 (2005).
365. Roe v. Crawford, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 2005).
366. Denise Johnston & Michael Carlin, When Incarcerated Parents Lose Contact with Their Children,
6 CCIP J (2004), available at http://e-ccip.org/journal.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
367. KATHERINE GABEL & DENISE JOHNSTON, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (1995); see
supra GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at 55.
368. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 41, at app. 6.
369. 196 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 1999).
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prisoner whose children sued claiming cruel and unusual punishment in order to
keep her in Wisconsin, although such an accommodation is not constitutionally
imposed on prison officials, "it may be a moral duty."37 Relatively few volunteer
organizations exist to fund or coordinate travel by visitors, which is a particular
problem for women in the federal system who are typically placed hundreds of
miles from their children, often at longer distances than male inmates due to the
smaller number of female facilities.
Visits are also subject to regulation. In Overton v. Bazzetta,3 7' restrictions on
noncontact visits to prisoners were upheld that excluded visits by minor nieces
and nephews and children as to whom parental rights had been terminated. The
regulations did allow visits between an inmate and her own children,
grandchildren, and siblings. Overton did "not imply, that any right to intimate
association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant" to
prisoner claims, but sustained the restrictions because they bore a rational
relationship to legitimate penological interests.7 The correctional officials had
argued that the regulations promoted internal security by reducing the total
number of visitors and by limiting the disruption caused by children. In addition,
they protected children from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from
accidental injury.
Overton also upheld a requirement that children be accompanied by a family
member or legal guardian as reasonable to ensure that the child is supervised by
adults who have the child's best interests in mind. A two-year ban on noncontact
visits for inmates with two substance abuse violations was also upheld, despite
the fact that it relegated some inmates to brief and expensive phone calls.
However, the Court recognized that if withdrawal of all visitation was permanent
or for a much longer period, or arbitrarily applied, the result could be different.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of a convicted child
molester's complaint that challenged a policy prohibiting his minor children from
visiting him because it raised a due process question.3 73 The Court noted that
because the liberty interest of parents to have a reasonable opportunity to develop
a close relationship with their children is important, and visitation may
significantly benefit both the prisoner and his family, it would not presume that a
security justification or other penological interest supported the restrictive
visitation policy.
374
After Overton, visiting still remains key to ensure that children bond with
their mothers and to encourage inmate rehabilitation. The decision does not
370. Id. at 802.
371. 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
372. Id. at 131.
373. Harris v. Donahue, 175 F. App'x 746, 747 (7th Cir. 2006).
374. Id. at 747-48 (citing Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion in Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 483 (1990); and Justice Marshall's dissent in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,
490 U.S. 454, 465-70 (1989)).
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prohibit or discourage the adoption of expansive visiting regulations of both a
contact and noncontact nature. However, the scope and nature of those
regulations are clearly within the discretion of the prison administrators, so long
as restrictions are reasonable. In other words, while requiring a family member or
guardian to accompany the child is tantamount to prohibiting the visit in many
cases, correctional officials can implement such rules.
In lieu of or addition to visiting, telephone calls maintain the parent-child
bond. While the federal system ensures that telephone services will be reasonably
priced, the amount of time allowed for calls are limited. In deciding whether and
where to incarcerate a mother of young children, post-Booker it is appropriate for
judges to take into account the distance from home and visiting policies of the
facility to which the female offender is likely to be incarcerated. In other words,
while barriers to visits do not extend the length of the sentence, they have the
effect of making the impact of the sentence greater than necessary, arguably in
violation of § 3553.
C. Privacy Concerns and Staff Sexual Misconduct in Correctional Settings
Privacy issues and sexual misconduct are currently viewed as correctional
rather than sentencing issues. However, there are legitimate reasons why judges
should take into account the risk that women offenders face in institutional
settings when making the decision about whether to incarcerate a female or
invoke an intermediate sanction. For example, the case law concerning cross-
gender pat searches and supervision of women while undressing and in
bathrooms and night garb has afforded women more constitutionally based
privacy rights than men in a prison setting, even in the context of an equal
protection challenge.375 Moreover, Jordan v. Gardner376 held that a Washington
State policy allowing male staff to conduct a pat search of female inmates
violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.3" The cross-gender searches in Jordan were random, nonemergency,
and suspicionless, conducted on women offenders who had prior histories of
abuse and were likely to feel revictimized by the intimate contact of their breasts
and genitals by male guards.378 Similarly, Everson v. Michigan Department of
Corrections379 upheld an order barring males from working in 250 positions in the
housing units of female prisons because the duties required officers to patrol
sleeping, shower, and bathroom areas. Designating these jobs as "female only"
was found to be a bona fide occupational qualification for Title VII purposes, in
375. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 (5th Cir. 2002). See generally Brenda V. Smith,
Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225 (2003).
376. 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
377. Id. at 1522-23.
378. Id. at 1526.
379. 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 364 (2005).
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part based on privacy concerns. 30 Thus, the individual histories of women limited
the range of correctional practices to which they could be subjected. It is hardly a
major step to recognize that these same histories should impact judicial decisions
about their initial placement.
The high-profile campaigns against sexual misconduct initiated by Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch and investigations by the United Nations
and the media38 ' have resulted in the virtual universal adoption of statutes
expressly criminalizing such behavior on the part of correctional personnel and
the introduction of extensive training programs sponsored by the National
Institute of Corrections.382 Some have suggested that international law provides
support for class action litigation aimed at eradicating sexual misconduct by staff
383in prison. One reaction to sexual abuse has been to designate some prison
positions as requiring female employees. In many countries, only women
supervise female offenders. In the United States, no national consensus currently
favors the wholesale exclusion of male officers from sensitive housing areas or
night shifts in order to lessen the possibility of sexual abuse or to lessen the fears
of male officers that they might be falsely accused of sexual misconduct.
However, in upholding a bar on male officers in certain housing units in
Michigan's female prisons, Everson relied primarily on the "endemic problem
with sexual abuse in Michigan's female facilities," as well as on the security,
safety, and privacy issues that were addressed by the exclusion. Due to the strict
standard for obtaining Title VII bona fide occupational qualifications, it is
unlikely that Everson will result in any wholesale trend toward sex segregating
correctional officers, which ironically would have the potential of limiting the
employment opportunities of female correctional officials who might be
excluded from male correctional facilities. 8 Yet, given the numbers of sexually
abused incarcerated women, Everson suggests that correctional officials have
some flexibility in designating some positions as female-only.
380. Id. at 753-54.
381. See generally AMNESTY INT'L, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE, supra note 9; see also U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., WOMEN IN PRISON: SEXUAL MISCONDUCT BY CORRECTIONAL STAFF (GAO/GGD-99-104, JUNE
1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99104.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
Brenda V. Smith, Sexual Abuse Against Women in Prison, 16 CRIM. JUST. 30 (2001).
382. See National Institute for Corrections, http://nicic.org/WebPage-78.htm (discussing focus on
training and providing materials discussing sexual misconduct) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
383. See generally Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating
International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law-A Case Study of Women in United
States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2000); see also Alvin J. Bronstein & Jenni Gainsborough, Using
International Human Rights Laws and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REV. 811 (2004); cf
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts on the Case of Women's Rights,
38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689 (2004).
384. See generally Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights of
Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1
(1999).
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So far, it appears that the BOP has resisted any shift in favor of more female
supervision. Therefore, if a woman being sentenced has a significant history of
sexual abuse, counsel should argue that placement is a sentencing factor, not
simply a matter of BOP policy as to staffing. In other words, it is inappropriate to
confine such a woman to a facility where there is a substantial likelihood that the
supervisory practices will retraumatize her. Indeed, it has been recognized that
for those with mental illness prison conditions may "nurture, rather than abate,
their psychoses. 385 One would hope that by today's standards, defendants are
sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment. As the Supreme Court
indicated in Farmer v. Brennan38 6 while discussing the parameters of an Eighth
Amendment violation for prison rape, "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is
simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.,' 387 The defense bar abdicates its responsibility to its female
clients by not arguing prison practices as valid considerations in sentencing.
Similarly, judges who deny such claims on the ground that they have no power as
to placement ignore the fact that, post-Booker, they can justify imposing a lesser
sentence on the defendant because of the absence of appropriate placements, in
situations where the other sentencing factors do not compel incarceration.
D. Lack of Access to Appropriate Programming
Due to their lesser numbers, women offenders have often been given less
access to programming and services. Limitations on class actions imposed by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act3 8 and a change in approach to equal protection
challenges in the prison context have made many of these claims less feasible.389
For women offenders who are substance abusers, treatment is often key to
obtaining an appropriate disposition, but most gender-neutral programming is
based on a male model. The likelihood of solving the underlying problems
caused by domestic violence, sexual abuse, and mental illness is remote unless
programs recognize the root causes that lead women to become substance
abusers. Thus, more attention needs to be given to ensuring the availability of
such programs to women as alternatives to incarceration. It is now well
recognized that "the needs of female substance abusers differ greatly from their
385. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 180 (D. Mass. 2004).
386. 511 U.S. 825 (1974).
387. Id. at 834.
388. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West 1997).
389. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Legal Appendix 110-14 in BARBARA BLOOM, ET AL., GENDER-
RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN OFFENDERS, NAT'L
INST. CORRECTIONS (2003), available at http://nicic.org/pubs/2003/018017.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When Individual Differences Demand Equal Treatment: An
Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 9
(2003).
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male counterparts."39 While the BOP has adopted gender-specific substance
abuse programs, the availability of sufficient long term programs for a specific
inmate is unclear, as is the availability of community correctional centers that cant 391
provide such treatment. Thus, in the revocation case, United States v. Cotton,
rather than blaming the female offender for her failure to be drug free in the
absence of appropriate programming, post-Booker, the judge should have given
more credence to a private placement to avoid a long prison term. Available work
options and training also tend to be less at female facilities, again due to smaller
numbers. In addition, healthcare is a significant issue at women's' institutions.
Ironically, many of these factors often lead to a higher cost of incarceration for
women. Thus, not only are women often shortchanged, but the public pays more
to accomplish this result. Post-Booker, what happens after women are
incarcerated should be factored into the analysis of a reasonable sentence.
X. REVOCATIONS OF FEMALES ON PROBATION AND SUPERVISED RELEASE
Cotton brings to the surface another potential difficulty, that judges who give
a break to women in sentencing may be fairly unforgiving when these women
fail to successfully complete probation or supervised release.392 Unfortunately, the
comment to section 7B 1.4 supports this view by noting that an upward departure
may be warranted where the original sentence included a downward departure.393
This problem is particularly acute with drug offenders, who judges often appear
to blame for their inability to reform, 94 but appears to apply to habitual property
offenders as well.9  Indeed, even the most sensitive judge may include so many
restrictions on probation that they would daunt all but the most competent
390. See, e.g., Lisa Dolan, et al., Gender-Specific Treatment for Clients with Co-Occurring Disorders,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2003, available at http://www.aca.org/publications/ctarchivespdf/october03/
todd.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Robert A. Shearer, Identifying the Special Needs of Female
Offenders, 67 FED. PROBATION 46 (2003).
391. 399 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2005); see supra text accompanying notes 349-50.
392. 399 F.3d at 915.
393. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 136 F. App'x 309, 310 (11 th Cir. 2005) (finding that a thirty-
six-month imprisonment exceeding advisory Guidelines range was not plain error).
394. See, e.g., id. (affirming a sentence of forty-six months upon revocation, instead of recommended
sentence of seven to thirteen months where judge had previously granted downward departure); United States v.
Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 245-46 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding for statement of reasons where the trial judge had
imposed a twenty-four-month sentence on revocation, rather than using three to nine month range, and court's
statement that defendant had a poor adjustment history in drug programs did not explain the length of the
departure).
395. See, e.g., United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 2005) (imposing two year sentence for
unauthorized credit card charges and possessing drugs, rather than twelve to eighteen month sentence due to
extensive criminal history); United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying statutory
maximum, rather than sentence within Guidelines range because of continued check incidents); United States v.
Rupert, 150 F. App'x 817, 819 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming sentencing of a mail fraud defendant to maximum
sentence on revocation that was significantly greater than the Guidelines range, where judge had referred to her
repeated and unremorseful pattern of lying and theft).
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defendants. 96 Treatment programs may not be easily available, and child care and
other medical and mental infirmities may overwhelm the women who are not in a
residential facility. Moreover, substance abusers rarely succeed in their first
attempts to break their addiction. Care must be taken not to set up a woman to
fail when the goal is for her to succeed.
Some judges appear to have zero tolerance for technical violations.397 For
example, a woman who maintained a steady job and had no new crimes and
some of whose supervision violations appeared tied to her hours at work was
ordered to serve an additional eight months.39s Revocations are reviewed for
reasonableness, which was also the standard pre-Booker.3 However, one of the
more oblique holdings on reasonableness occurred in United States v. Tedford,4
where the court explained:
To be clear, we do not hold that Defendant's sentence, which is more
than four times the outside limit of the recommended Guideline range, to
be reasonable. We hold that the sentence is not unreasonable for the
reasons presented by Defendant-that the district court failed to
adequately consider the Chapter 7 policy statements."'
This suggests that not only must defendants challenge the reasonableness of
their revocation, but must divine the particular issue that the court might agree
supports unreasonableness. Tedford also indicated that it was proper for the judge
to consider the resources of the probation department in the revocation
402decision, which is disconcerting since the probation department has indicated
its view that the defendant is wasting its resources by bringing the revocation in
the first place.
396. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 375 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (finding that
conditions required participation in drug and alcohol abuse treatment, mental health treatment, cognitive
intervention, and complying with conditions of home confinement).
397. Cf United States v. Peters, 394 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing upward departure for
obstruction of justice based on willful failure to appear at pretrial revocation hearing, which had been continued
at defendant's request).
398. United States v. Gasaway, No. 1:98 CR 72(1), 2005 WL 2284210, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005)
(indicating that the offender had already been afforded leniency in complying with supervision terms); United
States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 499-500 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding the maximum sentence was appropriate based
on the number of technical violations that included failing to attend mental health counseling sessions, despite
defendant's claim she was physically unable to attend the missed sessions).
399. See United States v. Livingston, 140 F. App'x 886, 889 (11 th Cir. 2005).
400. 405 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2005).
401. Id. atll61.
402. Id.
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XI. COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Over time, we have compounded our bad sentencing choices with equally
shortsighted refusals to fund community correctional facilities where parents can
reside with their children while obtaining the treatment and skills that are
necessary for them to live productive lives. Although nonviolent female
offenders pose a low risk to public safety, we ignore the fact that incarceration is
more costly than community corrections and seven times more expensive than
supervision by probation officers.4°3 At the same time, changes in social policy
have made it more difficult for single parents to avoid losing their children or to
successfully reunify with them after release. As previously discussed,4 federal
welfare and adoption legislation is reducing access to essential public benefits for
women offenders while simultaneously reducing the amount of time incarcerated
mothers have to reunite with their children before losing custody. "This growing.
. . interface between the criminal and civil court systems may create the
equivalent of a legal pincer movement, catching and separating successive
generations of women and children in its midst." 45 Under a post-Booker regime,
one would hope that community corrections would play a larger role in
sentencing.
Despite the negative impact of maternal separation on young children,
relatively few programs foster the mother-child bond. The BOP operates a
program entitled Mothers and Infants Together ("MINT"). Eligible women who
have been sentenced to incarceration reside in a community correction setting
with their infants for up to eighteen months after delivery. The only
Congressional attempt to create a family friendly community correctional
environment for women offenders and their young children, the Family Unity
Demonstration Project, was never funded. The stated purpose of the act was to
evaluate the effectiveness of community correctional facilities in helping to (1)
"alleviate the harm to children and primary caretaker parents caused by
separation due to the incarceration of the parents;" and (2) "reduce recidivism
rates of prisoners by encouraging strong and supportive family relationships."
'
The act was specifically designed to house "eligible offenders and their
children under [seven] years of age" in residential facilities that were not within
the confines of a jail or prison and which would provide a "safe, stable,
environment for children." 7 Eligible parents included nonviolent offenders who
had acted as a primary caretaker of the child prior to incarceration or had just
403. See Costs ofIncarceration and Supervision, 36 THIRD BRANCH 1 (2004).
404. See supra text accompanying notes 56-91.
405. Severing Family Ties, supra note 1, at 138.
406. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13881 (West 2005); see Nora V. Demlietner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing
Imprisonment with Targeted Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 352 (2005)
(noting that offenders with children may be lower recidivism risks). See generally Creating Correctional
Alternatives, supra note 345.
407. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13882.
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given birth and were willing to assume a primary caretaking role.408 The
residential facilities would provide programs to improve the stability of the
parent child relationship, as well as alcoholism and drug addiction treatment, and
services to help inmates obtain adequate housing, suitable education, and
employment and child care upon their release.49 However, despite a funding
schedule in the legislation, money was never allocated for this purpose. Thus, in
the present Guidelines environment, unless a family ties departure will permit
immediate reunification or ensure the mother's release at a time while the child is
still young enough to enhance their relationship, it will typically be denied.
4 0
That such facilities can better the lives of mothers and their children is being
demonstrated in California, which funded its Pregnant and Parenting Women's
Alternative Sentencing Program Act and opened several long term community
correctional facilities.' Women are sentenced directly to the program, and do not
serve time in prison. The focus is not only on treatment of the mother, but
emphasizes the development of the mother child bond. Children below the age of
six may reside with their mothers for up to three years. In addition, for the last
twenty years, California also has operated a Community Prison Mother Program,
where inmates with less than six years remaining on their sentences may reside
with their children in a residential facility where they receive comprehensive
programming to enable them to better reintegrate into their communities.
More recently, the findings of the Second Chance Act also identify family-
based treatment programs as demonstrating proven results for serving substance
abusing female offenders with children that significantly decrease recidivism.
Similarly, the Little Hoover Commission, California's permanent independent
oversight body, recently issued a scathing report that recommended that "[a] core
element of a strategic plan for women should be a robust system of community
correctional facilities." Small programs exist in a number of states, but
currently there is no groundswell to make such programs the norm rather than the
exception. One innovative program, the Regina Drew House, is being developed
by Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes, as a community-based
residential alternative to prison for defendant mothers and their children,
demonstrating that prosecutors as well as the correctional community have a role
to play in creating alternatives that serve female offenders and their children.
Although some percentage of women offenders will merit incarceration under
any policy approach, unlike earlier times, today only a handful of jurisdictions in
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See United States v. Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2000) (cautioning that "taking a few years
off a long sentence is worthless to children and costly to the program of proportionate punishment.").
411. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1174 (West 2004).
412. S. 1934 § 2, finding 20, 109th Congress, I st Sess. (Oct. 27, 2005).
413. BREAKING THE BARRIERS FOR WOMEN ON PAROLE (Dec. 15, 2004), available at www.lhc.ca.gov/
lhcdir/report 177.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Severing Family Ties, supra note 1; see
also Creating Correctional Alternatives, supra note 345.
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the United States have prison nurseries. The BOP is not currently in this group,
despite the fact that federal sentencing practices result in lengthy prison stays
even for women with no previous criminal history.
XII. THE FEDERAL COMMUNITY CONFINEMENT CENTER SNAFU
The BOP had a long-standing policy of placing eligible offenders in
community confinement centers (CCC), sometimes in lieu of prison for short
sentences but generally for the last six months of a prisoner's sentence.'" This
policy helped foster reentry and particularly benefited women who were given a
chance to jump through all of the hoops necessary to reunify with their children.
In late 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
determined that the BOP did not have the statutory authority to place an offender
in a CCC at the beginning of the sentence or to transfer an offender from a prison
to a CCC at any time during the sentence. It was widely reported that the impetus
for the change came from the DOJ, which viewed such placements as unfairly
benefiting white-collar criminals. The BOP then adopted a new policy,
implementing what is known as the ten percent rule, that transfer is appropriate
only for the last six months of a sentence or ten percent of the sentence,
whichever is less. Substantial litigation resulted, with many courts holding the
statutory interpretation underlying the new interpretation to be erroneous.4 5 As
Judge Weinstein pointed out,
"[a]rguably the BOP's policy is contrary to sound public policy as well
as the plain meaning of section 3621(b) and section 3624(c) of title 18 of
the United States Code. When appropriate, placement in a CCC promotes
the prisoner's reintegration into society, reduces unnecessary strains on
the prisoner's family and public welfare and lowers prison costs."4 6
The resolution of this issue is significant for women offenders, who were
disproportionately affected by the DOJ's change in policy. 4"7 At the same time the
overall decrease in the federal community correctional population was 4.8%, the
female community correctional population decreased by 12.5%.41s Similarly, the
mean expected length of stay in a CCC declined from approximately 113 days
414. For a general discussion of the history of CCCs see Todd Bussert & Joel Sickler, Grid and Bear It,
CHAMPION, Mar. 2005 at 42; Todd Bussert, et al., New Time Limits On Federal Halfway Houses, 21 CRIM.
JUST. 20 (2006).
415. See, e.g., Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2004) (rejecting statutory interpretation
underlying ten percent rule); Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Solomon v. Zenk,
No. 04-CV-2214, 2004 WL 2370651, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004).
416. Solomon, 2004 WL 2370651, at *5.
417. Several of the cases challenging the BOP regulations have been brought by women. See, e.g.,
Morales v. Francis, No. Civ.A. H-05-2955, 2005 WL 2467691 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2005); Lee v. United States,
No. Civ.A. 04-0610-CG-C, 2005 WL 2179796 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2005).
418. Information from BOPon file with the author.
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before implementation of this policy to eighty-one days, with the median stay
plummeting from 117 to fifty-seven days.4 ' 9 This may be attributed to the fact
that many women are nonviolent offenders who are serving short sentences and
are prime candidates for both immediate placement in community correctional
facilities and prerelease placement in such facilities for six months. While the
length of stay and population levels are reported to have recently increased, it is
likely that women are still being adversely affected when compared to their
experiences under the earlier policy. It has been suggested that judges can still
effectively designate that a defendant be placed in a CCC by sentencing the
individual to probation, with time served in the CCC as a condition of the
probation. After Booker, some judges may be amenable to following this route,
since it may involve a downward departure to a Guidelines sentence. However,
this approach is difficult for those judges who intend to follow the Guidelines
and their restrictions on departures. While it is always a possibility that the
prosecutor will not contest the departure, a judge may not believe it is appropriate
to depart if the case law appears to prohibit that result.
When it appeared that sentencing advocates had won the judicial battle
concerning CCCs, the BOP proposed a rule that announced its categorical
exercise of discretion by limiting "inmates' community confinement to the last
ten percent of the prison sentence being served, not to exceed six months. 42° The
Senate version of the Second Chance Act, which encompasses a number of
reentry issues, takes no position on the BOP's authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3621,
but would increase the total time that an individual can spend in a CCC to twenty
percent of the final portion of the term, not to exceed twelve months.42' The BOP
rule became effective on February 14, 2005, and has already generated litigation.
Trial courts have divided on the legitimacy of the new regulation.4 2 2 Recently, in
what is likely to be an influential decision, Judge Becker rejected the BOP's new
• 421
regulation in Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, the first appellate decision
on this issue. Woodall found that the regulation violated the plain meaning and
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which provides that the BOP must
419. Id.
420. 69 Fed. Reg. 51, 213 (Aug. 18, 2004).
421. S. 1934, Sec. 16 109th Congress 1st Sess. Sec. 16 (Oct. 27, 2005).
422. Compare Baker v. Willingham, No. 3:04cv1923, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23468 (D. Conn. Sept. 16,
2005); Wiederhom v. Gonzales, No. 05-360-TC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15079 (D. Or. May 9, 2005); United
States v. Paige, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Mont. 2005); Drew v. Menifee, No. 04 Civ. 9944, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3423 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2005); Pimentel v. Gonzalez, 367 F. Supp. 2d 365 (E.D.N.Y.2005); Cook v.
Gonzales, No. 05-09-AS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8771 (D. Or. Apr. 5, 2005); Crowley v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 312 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (invalidating regulation), with Charboneau v. Menifee, No. 05
Civ.1900, 2005 U .S. Dist. LEXIS 21622 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2005); Lee v. United States, No. 04-0610-CG-C,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2005); Moss v. Apker, 376 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Jackson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-2339, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26724 (D. N.J. July 20, 2005); Troy v.
Apker, No. 05 Civ. 1306, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14275 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2005); Yip v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 363 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding regulation).
423. 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005). Accord, Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2006).
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consider the history and characteristics of the prisoner, as well as other mandated
factors in exercising its authority. Since individual determinations could not be
made by reference to a blanket rule, the regulation was not entitled to deference
under the Chevron test for reviewing an agency's interpretation of its governing
424statute. However, as the decision recognized "that the BOP may assign a
prisoner to a CCC does not mean that it must." Thus, the remedy was to require
the BOP "to consider-in good faith-whether or not" to transfer the prisoner to
a CCC. Woodall specifically referenced the sentencing judge's recommendation
and the other § 3621 factors as part of the placement determination, in contrast to
the BOP's 2002 and 2005 policies, which should not be referenced.
The DOJ is not likely to change its position given Judge Fuentes dissent in
Woodall, citing trial court decisions that argue that the statutory factors need not
be considered until an inmate is actually considered for a transfer, with the
shortened timeframe dictated by the new policy. It is unfortunate that this entire
snafu has resulted from the DOJ ignoring the expertise of its own correctional
agency, which had viewed CCC placements as a tool providing flexibility in a
system that otherwise relies heavily on lengthy incarceration.
XIII. CONCLUSION: ELIMINATING BARRIERS THAT HINDER RE-ENTRY
AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION
Without congressional involvement in re-entry issues, it is unlikely that
offenders will easily reintegrate into their communities or with their families. A
bipartisan effort to address this problem is found in the Second Chance Act,
which would authorize a task force related to re-entry of offenders that would
study many of the collateral consequences that are so debilitating to all offenders,
but particularly to women who are trying to reunify their families. In addition,
money would be given to programs that foster the mentoring of children of
incarcerated parents, as well as financial support for the Federal Resource Center
for Children of Prisoners.425
Hopefully, the future will hold some promise that nonviolent women
offenders can obtain the treatment to enable them to reunify with their children
and succeed in the community. If not, we are likely to face what I have called an
"orphan-class" of children who are at risk of following in their incarcerated
mothers' footsteps.
424. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
425. See also ABA Criminal Justice Standards Concerning Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary
Disqualification of Convicted Persons, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/home.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (addressing many barriers to reentry).
